President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan stopped being the undisputed leader of the country. He won campaigns in the first round twice. 2014 with a result of 51.7%, and in 2018 - more than 52%.

However, Erdoğan is still Turkiye's number one politician, and his 49.3% result allows him to easily win the second round.

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu won a historic high for the opposition with a result of 45%.

The reserve for both candidates is 2,700,000 votes, which the third candidate, Sinan Oğan, won. However, even if he called on all supporters to vote for the opposition, it wouldn’t help.

Oğan was voted by people with nationalist views who do not accept the cooperation of both candidates with Kurdish political forces. This electorate can be divided between both candidates or not come to the election.

In both cases, barring a major miracle, Erdoğan will win by 51-52% in the second round.

Parliament remained under the control of the authorities. The People's Alliance of Justice and Development parties with the Nationalist Movement will have 320 out of 600 seats.

Even if we imagine the victory of Kılıçdaroğlu under such conditions, it will lead to a conflict between the branches of government. And most importantly, under these conditions, Kılıçdaroğlu will not be able to fulfill the main pre-election promise - to return to the parliamentary model and "restore democracy".

The risks of Recep Erdoğan's victory are that Turkiye's European integration will remain on the brakes.

The pre-election increase in the salaries of civil servants and budget employees to 22 thousand liras (44 thousand hryvnias) will increase inflation and the budget deficit.

Turkiye will not receive investments from Western countries and will be forced to look for resources in places where political freedoms and economic transparency are not so scrupulous.

This year, Russia has already postponed payments for gas to the Turks by 600 million dollars and can give more commodity (gas) credits for 3-4 billion dollars.

Such a situation could make Ankara economically dependent on Russia, as it is happening with Hungary.

Erdoğan will try to balance so as not to fall into complete dependence on Putin, but this requires a change of sentiments in Washington and Brussels regarding his governance.

Turkiye will continue to develop its own defense complex, and here Kyiv has advantages because it has the technologies and personnel that Ankara needs.

Turkiye will continue to lobby for a grain corridor from Ukraine through the Bosphorus, and will also advance to the Caucasus and the countries of Central Asia. Its eastward movement will depend on good relations with Moscow at this stage.