Just some analysis of few interesting thingies between latest developments…

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AIR/MISSILE WARFARE

Rather estranging but: once again, the VKS lost a fighter-bomber and once again, there are no such Ukrainian claims. Instead, and once again, it’s the ‘unofficial’ Russians who are reporting about this.

That said, they do not say anything about where or how: only that a Su-34 was shot down and the crew of two killed. Gauging by all the troubles this type is meanwhile known to have whenever facing PAC-2/3 Patriot SAMs… well, it’s quite likely ‘on hand’ what has got it…

And, because that is so cool, then this morning, another Su-34 was shot down – and this time 50km behind the frontline, reportedly by an F-16AM of the PSU. The Russians have meanwhile confirmed that loss: they are not talking about the reason, though…

Well, if truth, then perhaps somebody decided that the time is to take gloves off, and risk one of F-16s over the frontline, instead of letting them get shot down by PSU’s own SAMs. I do find this a sound solution. Was about the time.

This would also explain all the recent ZSU strikes on Russian SAM-positions behind the frontline (also well inside Russia). The only thing making me skeptical is the reported range: ‘50km’ would be something like ‘absolute max-max’ of the stuff like AIM-120B - the principal (medium range) air-to-air missile known to have been delivered to the PSU by now - under combat conditions preevalent in Ukraine. Perhaps somebody ‘rounded up a bit’? Can happen in excitement of the moment…

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Elsewhere as of this morning, and except for the Marine Oil Terminal in Feodosia, another Russian fuel dump is enthusiastically burning. This time, reportedly, the one in Rovenky, in the occupied Luhansk Oblast. That’s at least what the GenStab-U is claiming. According to Kyiv Independent, this is the 33^rd facility of this kind hit since March this year.

Ah yes, and sat photos have revealed why Ukraine has recently targeted the Khanska/Khanskaya AB: because the VKS’ security is still so good that they’re still stacking huge piles of wooden crates with bombs right next to the tarmac of that air base.

Always comforting to see the Keystone Cops in Moscow continue to outmatch those of the GenStab-U - and that by a wide margin.

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GROUND WAR

…where, while I’m at the GenStab-U: newest RUMINT in this regards is that the principal reason for both the existence of these ‘Groups of Forces’ of the ZSU (the Ukrainians are abbreviating them with OSGs and OTGs: that’s the command level between brigades and the GenStab-U in Kyiv; see, instances like ‘Khortsya’, ‘Tavryia’ and ‘Odesa’ etc.), and for establishment of ever additional new brigades is….

(drums)

...(quote) ‘a large number of old, useless generals’ still serving in the ZSU. These need some place to work, so are ‘parked’ there. Is said to be the reason why the GenStab-U is not expanding headquarters of multiple large brigades into divisions: it knows the generals in question are incompetent, and could easily ruin the units in question. So, ‘better’ to sideline them where they’re of no importance – because these OSGs and OTGs are simply playing no role in command and control whatsoever, except for enabling Syrsky and the GenStab-U to continue micromanaging all the while…

What a sound solution for something that’s, actually, no problem at all. Whoever is incompetent and/or deemed unable to do his actual job: why not re-training him or her for some other purpose?

For example: for de-mining. Even if each one removes just one mine a day, that’s still 365 mines a year. Now multiply that number by number of ‘surplus generals’ – and keep in mind: de-miners in Kherson and eastern Kharkiv are regularly removing 80,000+ Russian mines from 2-3 hectares of fields there…

But, of course, I’m digressing and rambling…

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In other news… today, I’ll focus on the Pokrovsk Sector, because I think I’ve under-analysed that one by quite a wide margin…

Seems, many of Ukrainians are agreeing with each other in regards of one conclusion: the Russians have re-focused all their attention on the Kurakhove sector,  and are attacking there with everything they’ve got.

Somehow, all the related chatter still failed to reach the GenStab-U and so it happened this was taken so much by surprise, the 15^th and 30^th Motor-Rifle Brigades, VSRF have not only managed to cross both the Zhuravka and Kazeny Torets Rivers, but the ZSU left them create a bridgehead each, which now must be expected to enable them to continue via Promin and Moskovske for Myrnohrad.

Really, I’m so surprised, can’t say. There’s simply nothing better but for just one person in Kyiv to be responsible for all of this. Forget all the babbling about ‘team’, and ‘delegating tasks’: that’s not how a military service is supposed to work!

Of course, those of us aware of consequence of such a (mis)organisation might wonder how should one person in Kyiv find out what of developments somewhere out there in the….what was the name again? ….ah yes, the Kurakhove area ….is important and what is not. Especially when one patches up a frontline with disparate battalions from multiple different brigades that never even trained together, and thus creates a situation where the battalion-commanders in question are too busy just commanding their troops and coordinating with neighbours to their left and right, but to report up the entire chain of command? …while, as described above, the HQ Khortsya – the instance actually supposed to be responsible for reporting such developments is, essentially, consisting of ‘parked’ generals that can’t do more but watch TV?

But hey: never mind. There’s nothing matching ideal solutions by the GenStab-U (registered trademark)…

Instead, I cannot but observe that I do find something else about the situation in this sector ‘ironic’. It’s that about whenever left to operate as compact brigades, ZSU units are really smashing the Russians in huge numbers. While, if patched up by single battalions from diverse brigades – then not.

And so, except for the 46^th Airborne, which has delivered some really spectacular videos, the last two weeks or so, just for example, check the battle fought by the 15^th NG Kara-Dag against the 27^th Motor-Rifle Division in Selydove. Over the last week alone, this brigade alone must’ve smashed about two dozens of major Russian assaults. Pay attention: a single brigade against a reinforced division, and still successful.

…it’s just a theory of mine, nothing substantiated, but: considering circumstances in the GenStab-U in Kyiv, only one conclusion about reasons for these successes is coming to my mind.

Because Syrsky hasn’t got any opportunity to become involved…

Which reminds me that, actually, I’m almost in tears and cannot but emphasise that the commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces deserves nothing else but all our empathy and sympathies. Mind that he’s so busy micromanaging battles in corners of Ukraine nobody can find on a map, that he has also missed his opportunity when the State Procurement Agency messed up with every single acquisition of artillery ammunition; then he didn’t know there was an opportunity to get a cut when a general of the same Agency pocketed a bribe of US$750,000, was dismissed and arrested (though… thinking of it… what a bloody amateur: just 750,000?!? …why not rounding that up to 1 million?!?); and, he is still doing nothing against the HQ Ground Forces ZSU blocking every single ‘unauthorised’ (read: nobody was bribed) acquisition of UAV-parts.

….which reminds me that it’s great that under Syrsky the UAVs are actually supposed to be operated by a separate branch of the armed forces, so the HQ Ground Forces cannot mess around with such processes…

Really, nothing is matching situations where there is one, super-responsible and hyper-competent general at the top, the great leader – and thus in charge of this bardak abbreviated with ZSU… Hail to the Chief!

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And now an update entirely focusing on Kursk… The reason is that there are more details on what was going on there, the last 3-4 days.

Namely, the Russians are claiming that they have deployed the 155^th NIB, plus the 56^th VDV and 106^th VDV Divisions in the Korenevo area, for a ‘second phase’ of their counteroffensive. Accordingly, the 810^th NIB was re-deployed for attacks from south-east.

For the start, so they report, on 10 October, VDV-assaults on Olgovka – a village about 5km east of Korenevo – not only recovered the place, but actually ‘surrounded 1,500 Ukrainian troops’. This was also reported by their media.

Finally, they say a pincer attack by the 155^th NIB recovered Novaya Sorochina and the Pokrovski Farm, thus encircling the Ukrainian troops in Lyubimovka. As next, and ‘taking Ukrainians by surprise’, the brigade bypassed Lyubimovka and reached the road connecting Korenovo with Sudzha in the Zeleny Shlyakh area. By the morning of 11 October, they claim to have recovered Novoivanovka and prompted Ukrainians to withdraw from Leonidovo, too…

For a while, it appeared to the Russians like if they would have the Ukrainians on the run. Indeed, even Ukrainian war-bloggers reported a break-through of the left flank of the Kursk Group and a ‘very precarious situation’. They reported a particularly pitched battle for Novoivanovka: this should have been so intensive, that even drone-pilots and artillerymen had to engage in combat (as infantry).

However, so the Russians, the ZSU ‘merely’ withdrew into the forest south of Lyubimovka and to the Tolstoy Lug area, and then - probably the 82nd Airborne - hit the 155^th NIB into the back as this attempted to drive down the road for Sudzha. Another Russian reported the ZSU lost four villages (including Olgovka and Zeleny Shlyakh), but then brought in reinforcements from Sumy and counterattacked. It was only at that point in time that the Ukrainians (i.e. their regular units, whether already present in the Kursk Oblast, or really recalled from Sumy and rushed to the scene) stopped the Russians by causing them heavy losses mentioned yesterday. For similar reason, the all the attempts of the 810^th NIB to punch through positions in Plekhovo ‘stalled’. Read: they were repelled.

Moreover, so the Russians, the ‘1,500 Ukrainian troops surrounded in the Olgovka area’ withdrew ‘through forest’ towards south, and thus ‘escaped encirclement’. The same for Lyubimovka: the Ukrainians there ‘disappeared’ out of the enirclement, ‘through a forest south of it’.

Still, the Russians are happy: although reporting they’ve captured next to no ZSU troops, they say the Ukrainian bulge into the Kursk Oblast was reduced by more than 50%.

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I know, about 90% of you are now going to complain that I’m ‘listening to the Russians’. However, fact is: for once, and regardless how few details are they revealing, both sides are nearly in agreement about what happened there.

And yes, of course, I do not know the backgrounds nor the how comes. I’m no proverbial fly on the walls in specific headquarters in Kyiv or Moscow. I can only guess about these. Still, there is just one Commander of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and he is well-known for micromanaging everything. Therefore, cannot avoid the impression that there can only be one person that signed the order based on the fantastic idea of ‘replacing’ battalions from some of best-equipped- and trained regular ZSU brigades by three brigades of the Territorial Defence (as obvious from my map from two days ago, the Lyubimovka area was defended by the 103^rd and 104^th TD brigades; Plekhovo was defended by the 129^th TD)… and that while knowing a Russian counteroffensive is coming, and not waiting to do such things only after the onset of the rainy season.

Hand on heart, this is making it crystal clear: the commander- and the GenStab-U are better than Zhukov, Manstein, Rommel, and Patton – combined… and their achievements are worth nothing less than the prestigious prize of ‘Military Genius of the Year 2024’.

The text is published with the permission of the author. First published here.