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After the thunderstorm with a mini-tornado and massive downpour of the last Saturday, my area was experiencing repeated losses of electricity. Plus, was busy helping clearing the debris and thus unable to work as intensively as usual: indeed, in some cases had to do double work on files damaged by several sudden power outages. Now, I’m sure that’s far from being even ‘roughly similar’ to what many of Ukrainians are experiencing since the Russian missile strikes of the last week have further increased the damage to the power-supply system of their country and, obviously, nobody is bombing me, but sight: it’s frustrating and time-consuming.
Anyway, looking back at where did I stop seems, my last update is from 2 June subsequently, I re-focused to answering some of your questions. Didn’t even manage the latter, and meanwhile it’s the middle of the month. Thus, it’s time for a more comprehensive review before I get back to answering questions – with the note that I’ll try catch with where Don stopped in his latest weekly.
Ah yes, sorry to start with spoiling celebrations over the Western decision to start using the Russian assets frozen at its banks to finance Ukraine, but: actually, the West decided to supply only the interests from that money to Ukraine, and that in form of a credit. Which is, in grand total, perhaps €3-5 billion in total per annum, and something Kyiv has to pay back. With other words: nope, the West is not financing Ukraine with help of the frozen Russian assets: it merely found a way to continue sitting on the Russian money while profiting from the situation through securing own interests in Ukraine.
So unexpected, can’t say. What a surprise then – at least for the mass of ‘established’ politicians and their political parties in the EU – when so many of EU-citizens were frustrated into electing yet additional populists into the EU parliament. Which, as some say, is a fault of such like me and if not, then a major conspiracy at governmental level. Not some sort of systemic corruption and incompetence, or governance on behalf of our own oligarchy, of course: alone any such thoughts are nothing else than ‘Marxism’…
Not the least surprising are our glorious politicians, which these days are standing in the queue to explain to whatever media is ready to listen that, ‘we did everything right (during their campaigns for the EU elections), there’s no need to change anything’.
AIR/MISSILE WAR
Generally Germany rushed another (4th in grand total) PAC-2 SAM-system to Ukraine, together with 100 missiles.
The VKS continues releasing 130-150 (registered) UMPK glide bombs against Ukrainian positions along the frontline. Usually from ranges of around 45-50km away from the frontline. The ZSU can consider itself for lucky so many of these continue to malfunction, otherwise it would’ve got blown away already weeks ago.
BTW, it’s not only the UMPKs that are failing: older PGMs like this Kh-29 (ASCC/NATO-reporting name ‘AS-14 Kedge’) are regularly malfunctioning, too - so that then yet additional Ukrainians must risk their lives while disarming and removing them.
For its part, the PSU has integrated French-made HAMMER PGMs on few of its Su-25s, while Macron announced the delivery of a handful of Mirage 2000-5 interceptors modified (by Dassault) to carry SCALP-EG missiles to Ukraine. Is a funny story, related to an incompetent bankier’s party losing a lot in the last-week’s elections for the EU parliament. I’ll get back to this in the coming days.
After targeting the Akhtubinsk AB and damaging two Su-57 prototypes, on 6 June, early on 8 June, Ukrainian UAVs have hit the Mozdok AB (770km from the border to Ukraine): forward operating base for the Russian MiG-31Ks and Tu-22M-3 bombers. AFAIK, results of that strike remain unknown.
Early on 10 June, the 19th Missile Brigade ZSU (apparently the only Ukrainian unit operating ballistic missiles, so also US-supplied ATACMS) reportedly damaged the Russian S-400 SAM-system in Dzhankoi and two S-300 SAM-systems in Yevpatoria and Chornomorske.
On or around 10-11 June, the Russian Zala UAVs have tracked down and then knocked out another S-300 SAM-system of the PSU by two Iskander-Ms - and that in the Poltava area, 100km behind the frontlines. Then they deployed two additional Iskander-Ms against the Myhorod AB (Poltava Oblast): the home-base of the 831st Brigade PSU, apparently destroying this Su-27UB on the ground:
During the night from 11 to 12 June the Russians released 4 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles, 1 Iskander-M, 1 Kinzhal, and 24 Shaheds upon Ukraine. This time, at least 1 Kinzhal and all the cruise missiles and attack drones were claimed shot down by the PSU. Nevertheless, hits and fires were reported from an industrial area in Kyiv, and the Iskander-M seems to have hit something in Kryvyi Rih.
Meanwhile…now, must admit I’m not 100% sure whether this was a new attack, or rather a result of reporting about results of the strikes of 10 June, but: the 19th Missile Brigade ZSU continued dismantling elements of the 31st Air Defence Brigade of the Russian Air-Space Force on the occupied Crimea. This time, it hit the S-300 SAM-site deployed in the Yevpatoria area, destroying its command post, a radar, one of launchers, and two service vehicles. Ever since, the Ukrainians – who were first cheering that the ‘Russians are withdrawing their air defences from the Crimea’ – are reporting that the Russians are now deploying one of their latest superturbowunderwaffe S-500 Prometheus/Triumfator-M SAM-systems in the Crimea.
Planned to replace all the old S-300s, this is in operational service with a single regiment since 2021. That said, and although the Russian Ministry of Defence placed an order for 10 S-500-systems, it seems the entire project is experiencing significant delays caused by Western sanctions and thus still very much undergoing research and development (read: the manufacturer is searching for alternative suppliers for the Western high-tech installed into its systems). The Russians claim the S-500 has a range of 500km and (contrary to old S-300) a ‘serious’ anti-ballistic missile capability. ‘Of course’, its yet another of Putin’s Gods of War, capable of intercepting hypersonic missiles, the Battlestar Galactica, and everything else coming its way – in addition to cooking tchay, baking cookies, and playing latest pop-music hits, too.
Actually, as far as I know, the mass of that is pure theory: especially the S-500’s anti-ballistic missile capability was never tested in real world (not even at Kapustyn Yar, like this is usually the norm for every new Russian missile system, regardless its nature). Thus, lets first wait and see if the VKS might really deploy its S-500 there, in the Crimea, and then how is that going to perform in combat.
The last night (13-14 June)… the Russians released:
- 10 Kh-555 and Kh-101
- 3 Iskander-M
- 1 Kinzhal
- 17 Shaheeds.
Upon Ukraine: the PSU claimed 7 cruise missiles and all 17 Shaheds as shot down.
While Ukrainian UAVs have hit the Morozovsk AB: home-base of the 559th Bomber Aviation Regiment (equipped with Su-34s), in the Rosov-na-Donu area.
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BATTLE OF DONBAS
Generally, the reasons for the Russian offensive in northern Kharkiv are becoming ever more obvious. Principal aim was (and remains) to distract the ZSU enough from its efforts further east. Indeed, meanwhile it’s sure that the Ukrainians are re-directing the mass of their reinforcements and – especially – supplies in artillery shells to northern Kharkiv, which in turn enables the VSRF to continue grinding forward in the East. A bit in the south, too. Indeed, in some sectors the Russian ‘rate of advance’ accelerated to something like ‘1 village a week’. Perfectly in sense of the Pudding’s illusion ‘forward to the victory’.
Sumy. Early on 10 June, the VSRF ‘invaded the Sumy Oblast’… well, actually, the Russian generals know all too well what happened they invaded this oblast the last time (in February 2024), and thus now they’ve opted for a limited attack from Tetkino to seize the border village of Ryzhivka. The fighting there is going on. I do remain on a standpoint that not much more should be expected in this area, but sure: the Russians are likely to continue attempting similar ‘raids’ and grab this or that portion of the Ukrainian territory.
Northern Kharkiv. Ukrainians have pushed the Russians almost completely out of Vovchansk, except for that western side of the town. The Russians there have continued reporting ‘colossal’ losses – in troops and vehicles: some say they’re so critically short of BMPs, that troops are collecting own money to buy themselves one or another you have three guesses from whom.Thus, whoever is still alive is meanwhile busy constructing a major defence line about 1000 metres north of the town.
Siversk. The Russians did manage some incremental advances (see: one tree-line here, another there) along the southern side of this sector.
Bakhmut. Between 5 and 8 June, the Russians have managed to enter and then establish multiple strongholds inside the Kanal District. Meanwhile, they’re credited with holding most of it, too.
South of Chasiv Yar, the Russians are still trying to grind themselves over the Siversky Donets – Donbas Canal.
Avdiivka-Pokrovsk.The last 7-10 days, the VSRF reinforced its assaults in this sector. In the north, they are assaulting from Novopokrovske and Kladovyshche on Novoselivka Persha (both are west of Semenivka). In the northern sector of the Ocheretyne area, the Russians have entered Novooleksandrivka: some claim up to 90% of the latter village as under the Russian control. In the centre, they have seized Novopokrovske and continue assaulting Sokil. In turn, the ZSU is shelling Ocheretyne ‘like mad’. That said, one should keep in mind that the Ukrainians are rarely defending any of villages in question (or the Kanal District of Chasiv Yar) with more than a battalion of troops: usually 200, rarely up to 300-400 troops. There’s simply not enough space to ‘pump more troops inside’ any of places. Thus, while the Russian social media is full of reports about another assault group of 20-30 troops being killed and wounded to the last, the Russians can at most hope to kill and/or 2-3, perhaps 10 of Ukrainians in return - and that after some 5, 6, 7, 8 of their own assaults (i.e. after suffering some 100+ losses in killed and captured).
But, if the VSRF has anything left ‘in numbers’, nowadays, then troops…
Mariinka The Russians continued grinding into the village from the south: advanced something like ‘one road’ far. Their assaults from the east, though, were all smashed.
Staromayorske. Sadly, on 9 June, the Russians have managed to push the Ukrainians out of Staromayorske. At least Urozhaine remains under the ZSU control, but there are Russians are inside the southern side of that village, too. Official Kyiv first denied the loss of Staromayorske, then claimed the Russian flag planted there was destroyed, then fell silent… Unofficially, and contrary to what is meanwhile usual within the Ukrainian armed forces, this did cause lots of critique – especially to the address of the CO 1st Tank Brigade. Apparently, the gent in question made a series of mistakes while commanding positions in Staromayorske, resulting in unnecessary losses in troops and vehicles, plus the village - but was advanced in rank to that of a general.
The content is published with the permission of the author. First published here.
