Late last night, have received some very bad news from a specific sector of the frontline in Ukraine. Had a sleepless night over that. Indeed, when I grew fed up of myself and decided to get up, had only one thought on my mind: monitoring this war, and especially the performance of the ‘Buddies’ (the General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces) is meanwhile like watching a slow-motion-video of a car crash. The outcome is unavoidable, because it’s pre-determined. After all, it’s a video of a car crash, not some cat-video on the Facebook.

The question is only in what direction and how much are what parts of the car in question going to get squashed.

‘But’, hey: of course, not all the things are that bad in Ukraine. You see, the latest explanation en vogue within the government in Kyiv, much of the Ukrainian social media, and between the local war commentators, is that things are either already ‘under control’ or at least ‘about to get significantly better’.

Because, between others, Russia is about to run out of tanks and artillery pieces.

Sometimes in 2026.

My calendar says that there is still the rest of the Year 2024, and then some 365 days and 12 months of the Year 2025 before ‘sometimes in 2026’. And that one might want to check if the Russian Armed Forces (VSRF) haven’t been completely reformed in the meantime, so that they’re far less reliant on tanks and artillery than they used to be.

However, that with calendars is not valid in Ukraine any more. Perhaps, right after developing that fantastic peace-plan, the Zelensky Administration also outlawed the calendars for the rest of this, and the next year… or deleted the Year 2025…?

…how? You want to know more about the reform of the VSRF? Essentially: from tanks and self-propelled artillery to armoured personnel carriers to desert crosses to motorcycles to civilian cars…supported by cable-guided FPVs.

But, don’t worry. That simply doesn’t matter – because the Buddies can’t reform themselves and thus not the ZSU. And if the Buddies can’t: why should then one pay attention about reforms run by ‘stupid Russians’ like the Keystone Cops in Moscow…?

Hard on heels of such fantastic news, there are even better news about the development of indigenous Ukrainian tactical ballistic missiles and artillery rockets. This is coming forward at such an amazing pace, can’t say. The Hrim ballistic missile is, finally, where it was back in 2014 (see ‘undergoing testing’), while Vilkha rockets are troubled by the lack of parts not manufactured in Ukraine.

…which reminds me of wondering by a friend and colleague, from yesterday evening, about how comes even the funding for research, development, and series production of such systems (plus for Neptune) was never secured by official Kyiv?

A perfect comparison coming to my mind: on 22 September 1980, Iraq invaded the freshly-declared ‘Islamic Republic of’ Iran. At the time, the latter was in a state of utmost chaos. A multi-party, murderous civil war was raging in much of the country, the economy was at still-stand (all oil exports were stopped already since February 1979), and the…ahem… ‘government’ not only ignored all the warnings of its intelligence services about the coming Iraqi invasion, but belittled these.  Corruption was reaching such proportions that even the authorities in modern-day Ukraine would be deeply ashamed (and mind: thanks to their oil/gas-wealth, the Iranians also had the necessary baksheesh)…

….and still: in a matter of days after the Iraqi invasion began, the exports of oil were re-launched, and dozens of front companies were established in London, all running large-scale, clandestine acquisition of arms and ammunition from abroad, and that despite an UN-imposed world-wide arms embargo. A month or so into the war, the FASHA – electronic warfare branch of the air force, equipped with US-made high technology back then considered ‘from another planet’ because it was that advanced – was rebuilt and returned to action; another month later, the air force was integrating US-made AIM-7 and AIM-9 air-to-air missiles to its F-14 Tomcats; yet another month later, both army and navy began adapting their doctrine and tactics; less than six months later the local factories were back to manufacturing artillery shells, mortar bombs and developing artillery rockets in three shifts a day (so also predecessors of the Fath, which – according to the brilliant Ukrainian military intelligence – ‘Iran is [nowadays] selling to Russia’), naval aviation began adapting US-made AGM-65 Maverick electro-optically guided missiles to its SH-3D Sea King helicopters, and the air force began adapting navy’s RIM-66A Standard surface-to-air missiles to its F-4E Phantom II fighter-bombers, or for deployment against Iraq’s MiG-25 three-sonic reconnaissance jets… while two years into that war, the completely rebuilt and reformed Iranian army was defeating multiple divisions of the well-organised Iraqi war machinery and liberating Khorramshahr…

Of course, such examples do not matter. Regardless if in Ukraine or in ‘the West’. They simply do not count – because related to ‘Iran’, and that’s a rogue nation, and what should noble Westerners learn from such thugs? And, very likely, half of super-competent and ah-so-progressive Ukraine would (just like most of ‘the West’) promptly ridicule Iranians as ‘dusty camel drivers’ – although proving unable of launching the series production of artillery shells or even one of their own advanced weapons systems even 10,5 years after the initial Russian invasion…

Nah. It’s much more opportune to continue wasting time with fantasies like Zelensky’s peace plan – to which there was not one (in digits, and more precisely: 0) positive reaction from ‘the West’ – and blame that darn incompetent ‘the West’, its zombie idiots, and different of its media representatives for everything that’s going wrong in Ukraine.

Things would’ve been so much better if the country was accepted to NATO and EU already back in… 1877, or whenever…

Nevermind: now it’s South Korea that’s going to help Ukraine out of troubles. The country’s got to change a few of its laws about arms exports, and has already proved so fantastically helpful when announcing different projects for joint weapons production, two years ago… none of which was ever realised.

But, South Korean help is already underway, that’s 1000% guaranteed…

I’m really sorry, but the only conclusion coming to my mind is that the sole explanation for this fracas possible is a ‘perfect’ mix of ultimate incompetence and corruption at the highest points of governance in Ukraine. Within the media, too. Combined with a national penchant for avoiding unpleasant facts that is easily outmatching that of the Iraqis. So much so, in comparison, even the endemically corrupt Islamic Republic of Iran at the times of worst chaos of 1980-1983 was a ‘perfectly organised and well-functioning’ nation.

That much about that…

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AIR/MISSILE WAR

What a surprise: because there were no Ukrainian UAV-strikes on Russian air bases in something like two weeks (sole exception was Lipetsk AB, hit during the night from 19 to 20 October), the VKS is back to releasing up to 170 UMPK glide bombs a day. But, hey:  up to 40% of these are dropped upon ZSU positions inside the Kursk Oblast in the Russian Federation. Entire Ukraine – read: Kyiv and the areas west of it – can breathe much better now, and I’m sure the ZSU troops in the Kursk Oblast are delighted, too. This, even more so because Ukrainians are wasting their long-range, attack UAVs for targeting thermal powerplants in Bryansk and Tula instead..

As concluded in Ukraine already weeks ago, the Russians are also about to run out of stocks of Shahed attack-UAVs. Correspondingly, during the night from 19 to 20 October, the Russians streamed an unknown number of Shaheds (probably some 110) over Ukraine – in addition to firing an unknown number of Iskander-Ms, Kn-23s, Kh-35s, Kh-31s. As usually, the PSU was extremely successful: 59 Shaheds were claimed shot down and another 45 jammed by electronic warfare. Results of the Russian missile strikes were not mentioned with a single word. Similarly, during the night from 22 to 23 October, another 60+ Shaheds followed. Doesn’t matter: 40 were shot down, another 10 jammed, and if one is not reporting what have the remaining 10+ - or all the Russian missiles fired at the same time - hit, then they’ve hit nothing.

This is such a perfect solution that it’s better to distract by cheering the assassination of the Chief of Staff 52^nd Guards Heavy Bomber Regiment, VKS, instead: that’s going to teach the Russians a lesson and certainly curb operations of their Tupolev Tu-22M-3 bombers. Doesn’t matter if these haven’t flown a single strike on Ukraine in something like three weeks: since around the times they were bombing Vuhledar by free-fall bombs…

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GROUND WARFARE

Kursk… since the 95^th Airborne smashed at least a battalion of the Russian 155^th Naval Infantry Brigade, back on 17-18-19 October, it’s – relatively – quiet. Arguably, a battalion of the 47^th Mech (equipped with M1 tanks and M2/M3 Bradleys) run some additional counterattacks and smashed quite a lots of additional Russians in Novoivanvovka, too, but: it failed to completely recover the village. The Russians are wasting no time, though: they continue bringing reinforcements to this sector, including the 137^th VDV Regiment (106^th VDV Division). Indeed, it seems they are intending to finish the ZSU in Kursk by a concentric attack of their desantniki (airborne assault troops). Probably something like this:

-          56^th and 137^th VDV Regiments from direction of Korenevo;

-          810^th NIB from the west;

-          11^th VDV and 24^th Spetsnaz from southeast.

That said, the actual worst news from Kursk of the last week or so is the large-scale deployment of wire-guided UAVs by the Russians. These cannot be jammed at all. The only ‘good’ thing about them is their relatively short range: 5,000 to 7,000 metres. Because of the cable used for their guidance, and which they’re ‘towing’ after them.

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BATTLE OF DONBASS

Kupyansk-Svatove… this is the area the news from which kept me sleepless, the last night. Arguably, haven’t got a really detailed description, but… well, when certain people in Ukraine tell me about ‘break-through’, then I know it’s time to get very worried.

Essentially, the news is that the Russians have managed to break into Kruhlyakivka, and to reach the Oskil River there. The 115^th Mech fell back to Hlushkivka in the north; the 154^th Mech to Zahryzove in the south (and Senkove on the western side of the Oskil). The Russians also collapsed the frontline of one of Ukrainian units (not sure there was a single full ‘brigade’ deployed there) somewhere on the northern side of the Pishchane bulge, and advanced in direction of Kupyansk. The Buddies rushed much of the 3^rd Assault and the 92^nd Assault Brigades to the scene, but… sigh… well, essentially, as of the last night, the two were trying to re-establish a coherent frontline over a stretch of some 25 kilometres.

…try doing that with ‘two brigades’, by night and in mud…

BTW, interestingly, that would be something like ‘divisional’-sector, but… well, in the ZSU, there are still no formations officially designated ‘divisions’: the Buddies are going to continue giving this idea a serious consideration, of course - unless they find they have more important things to do, and postpone this affair - to 2026 or so…?

Unsurprisingly, the ZSU troops there are already reporting that the ‘Second Battle of Kupyansk’ is now in full swing.

As for who is attacking there on the Russian side: it’s the (re-re-re-built) 1^st Guards Tanks Army, including the 47^th Tank Division.

***

Toretsk…the Ukrainian… ahem… ‘counteroffensive’ initiated sometimes in early October, has regained quite some of the quarter with high-rise buildings in the centre of the town. Say: about 500 by 200 metres. Exactly how much: nobody can say, because both sides are zip-lip. Certain is only that no significant Russian advances have been reported in days. The VSRF is meanwhile known to be deploying ‘significant reinforcements’ to this sector. Thus ‘to be continued’…

***

Pokrovsk… since around Monday (21 October) the Russian offensive on Pokrovsk is back to ‘all-out level’. Primary target is Selydove. The 15^th NG Kara-Dag is defending the place in really a fantastic fashion, and smashing the Russians in huge numbers. Nevertheless, the Group Tsentr has managed to grind its assault groups into the north-eastern corner of the town. Foremost, the Russians kept the ZSU in Selydove so busy, the Ukrainians lacked the troops that could stop their advances south of the town – probably with intention of reaching Vyshneve and Novodmytrivka, so to start isolating Selydove.

Moreover, since Monday, the Russians are foremost pushing in southern direction: they’ve captured Izmailivka, west of Hirnyk (thus began to isolate this strong ZSU position), and Kurahivka, further south.

***

Uspenivka sector… yes, sure, on 19 October, the 79^th Airborne has repelled yet another ‘big’ Russian mechanised attack: 19 tanks and infantry fighting vehicles were involved (is it me, or are the numbers ‘growing’ ever smaller and smaller?): 6 were destroyed, 4 damaged… but, in grand total the Russians continued to grind themselves towards Antonivka, Yelyzavetka, and Bohoyavlenka, and the ZSU has not the ammunition necessary to stop them cold.

***

Amid all of this, something like actual good news is that it’s video confirmed that the Russians are losing 1,000+ troops killed – a day. For 54+ days already. Again: that’s video confirmed.

Is a rate of losses that would’ve been highly promising back in 2023. Nowadays… not so sure any more. We’ve got to wait and see.

Apparently more promising is the fact that yesterday – probably by accident, rather than design – the Buddies have appointed ex-CO 28^th Mech Brigade, Colonel Halaburda, the new commander of the UAV-Force, ZSU.

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