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In the first part of this article, I described the basics of the existing technologies of Western general-purpose bombs and guided bombs; the basics of Russian general-purpose bomb technology, as well as the reasons why the Russians, having a need for “a large number of high-precision guided bombs”
Before I continue, and at the request of a few readers, I will return to the practice of adding a list of abbreviations.
FAB= Russian abbreviation for aviation bomb
JDAM= Joint Direct Attack Munition (family of US-made GPS-guided bombs)
CABS= Russian abbreviation for guided aerial bomb
CABS= Ukrainian abbreviation for guided air bomb or guided bomb (this abbreviation seems to be used in a general sense, regardless of the weapon in question, i.e. whether it is a Russian CAB or IPC/UMPC)
MPK = Russian abbreviation for gliding and correction modules
PSU = Ukrainian abbreviation of the Ukrainian Air Force (and Air Defense Forces)
RBK= Russian abbreviation for single-sided cluster bomb (better known in the West as “cluster bomb block”)
ZRK = anti-aircraft missile complex
UMPK= Russian abbreviation unified set (modules) of gliding and correction
WKS = Russian abbreviation Air and Space Forces of Russia
ZSU= Ukrainian abbreviation for Armed Forces of Ukraine
Without guidance, they were not accurate. I have been silent about this for months, but I have been observing their use since February-March of this year and can only say that even at the end of the summer of this year, most of the servicemen of the Armed Forces who became the “target” for Russian glider bombs described their use something like this.
On average, of the 10 IPC/UMPC bombs released by the Russian Air Force, at least 5 did not hit the target:
- at least 5 did not reach the target by 200-500 meters
- 4 more - more than 500 meters;
- maybe 1 fell somewhere less than 200 meters from the target.
And that's a conservative estimate based on a “slice” of about 50 related reports.
Obviously, this caused some confusion in the (lower) ranks of the Armed Forces: no one on the battlefield could say for sure what exactly the Russians were firing at and why.
The reason for the lack of accuracy was the lack of guidance systems: it took the Russians time to get the necessary high technologies, and then launch something like mass production of MPK/UMPC kits. Moreover, it is obvious that it took them months to test and refine them - and to polish the tactics of applying them: to learn how to do it right.
And the main way in which they deploy their IPC/UMPC, meanwhile, remains the same as in March-May of this year: from a height of about 9000 m, from an aircraft at a small height range.Why? Because this not only increases the range of the weapon, but also ensures that the aircraft that launches the glider bomb remains well beyond the reach of most Ukrainian anti-aircraft missile systems (anti-aircraft missile systems).
Of course, there are reports of low-altitude IPC/UMPC launches from a range of 9-10 km, but so far we have not seen any evidence of this. Apparently, they will be difficult to provide - except in the form, for example, of a video recording in which a Su-34 flies very low above the ground before releasing one of these munitions.
Early models of the MPK/UMPC received “only” a kit that included folding wings. Note: this was enough to maintain their stability at a range of about 60 km. This solution was not ideal, but better than anything previously available, and the accuracy was obviously higher than could be expected (i.e. below 1-2 km).
The second model received only an inertial guidance system sufficient for stabilization in flight. In April-May, the Russians began testing the MPK/UMPC models, equipped with receivers of GPS and GLONASS navigation systems, and then weapons equipped with guidance fins. Indeed, somewhere in May, the Ukrainians found the first fragments of an MPK/UMPC with a GPS receiver - and that of the Irish company Taoglas. Below is a snapshot of the wreckage of one glider bomb that was fitted with a guidance section.
From June to July, reports appeared in the Ukrainian media that the Russians had begun to strengthen the guidance sections of their glider bombs by installing electronic countermeasure systems - which in turn indicates that the PSU and the Armed Forces are already responding to the appearance of guided gliders by disrupting the operation of their guidance systems.
The problem: whether the bombs were controllable or not, many of them appeared completely unexpectedly or with very little warning. Of course, the air defense detects and tracks Su-34s as they approach and issues warnings. However, troops on the ground sometimes do not receive them, and if they do, they can not always hide in time for shelter. Therefore, when - time and time again - one or the other IPC/UMPC still fell within 200 meters of its aiming point/target, the results were terrible.
Suffice it to say that during this summer, many Ukrainian villages located 2-10 km behind the front line suffered long (multi-day, if not weekly) strikes by glider bombs. Settlements such as Mala Tokmachka (north of Robotyne), for example, suffered significant destruction: often one IPC on the basis of FAB-250M-62 was enough to demolish two single-family houses.
In addition,
A) by the summer, the Russians had deployed their glider bombs in such quantity that the IPC/UMPC began to be felt strongly, and
B) please make no mistake: when a 500-kilogram warhead explodes within a radius of 200 meters from you, it is “felt”. Very strong.
One detail that is often ignored about the latest IPC/UMPCs is that their detonator has not changed over time: even in recent photos, the so-called point detonators, or fast detonators, are visible up close. This conclusion is confirmed by videos of their detonation from the Ukrainian side: for example, videos showing how huge masses of soil soar into the sky from explosions, the blast wave from which flies up and out.
The detonator not only detonates the bomb - causing it to explode - but also determines at what height and in which position the bomb will explode, thus increasing (or, in the negative case, decreasing) its effectiveness. Rapid detonators are the most common type of detonators on Russian aircraft bombs: they are simple contact detonators that usually detonate the bomb at ground level. This means that the mass of the explosion spreads upward, which, in turn, significantly reduces its explosive and shattering effect. Such bombs are not suitable for destroying, for example, Ukrainian field fortifications. Surprisingly, but it is good for the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation that there are still not even such “simple” subverters as the so-called “daisies” (also known as “extenders”), which were adopted by American troops during the Second World War. Detonator extensions are not really anything special: the simplest of them have a length of about 1 m (or 1000 mm). Their purpose is to cause the bomb to explode at least 1 m above the surface (or at least not to go too deep before detonation).
Another reason for the relative ineffectiveness of Russian glider bombs is the position of their hulls during detonation. They fly on a ballistic trajectory and thus fall to the ground on an almost vertical trajectory: combined with a fast detonator, this causes the bulk of the energy of their detonation to be directed upwards, relatively little to the side, and very little to the immediate surroundings at ground level. This means that even if a bomb hits, for example, a trench or bunker, it will cause relatively little damage.
Ideally, a bomb aimed at field fortifications should fly as parallel to the ground as possible and explode at a height of 5-10 meters above the surface - so that the energy of its detonation is sprayed over as large an area as possible.
This is something that the Russians will not be able - just now - to change significantly. At the very least, it will take them time (as well as understanding why US-developed so-called “slow down” bombs such as the Mk.80, equipped with Mk.12 Snake Eye retardants, were so effective in the numerous wars of the 1960s-1980s, compared to various Soviet bombs of a similar calibre Bru, including with all possible FAB-250 and FAB-500).
Not surprisingly, given the overall low accuracy of the MPK/UMPC, there are already statements that the Russians are equipping their RBC series cassette bomber units (KBCs) with MPK/UMPC glider wings and guidance kits. Theoretically, a glider bomb based on the RBK-250 or RBK-500 can deploy its warheads over a large area, which significantly increases its effectiveness. However, so far we have not seen any evidence that RBCs are equipped with MPK/UMPC kits.
According to the official Kyiv, during October, the VCS of the Russian Federation produced more than 1,000 MPKs/UMPKs. The highest figure is 80 glider bombs in one day. The weapon in question was still uncontrollable, so the results were “normal”. However, at the end of that month, there were first reports that the Russians were deploying their glider bombs to strike bridges - for example, in the area of Kupyansk. Hitting bridges with unguided aerial bombs will never work, so this is clear evidence that the VCS is getting more and more controllable models in the meantime.
Coincidentally, the latest news on the subject has been published by RIA Novosti on December 1. In the article, it is reported that “recently, a batch of Su-34 front-line bombers was transferred to one of the training centers of the Russian Aerospace Forces, which will be used for mass training of pilots in the use of air bombs from the UMPC, which have already proven themselves well in the area of the special operation on the territory of Ukraine.
This will increase the number of pilots who can use these munitions, and increase the number of strikes by “smart air bombs” in the area of the Northern Military District on Ukrainian military facilities.
Provided that this can be trusted (and you can never be sure of this when it comes to Russian “media”), this would mean that the WCS has completed the “research, development and testing” phase of work on the IPC/UMPC. That they are now beginning to train large groups of their Su-34 crews in the use of such weapons.
In general, no matter how rude it sounds, the MPC/UMPC is really “bad news”. Meanwhile, they are deployed in such numbers and with such regularity that the Armed Forces feel the pressure that this entails: they suffer losses. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to change unless the West provides Ukraine with a sufficient number of long-range surface-to-air missiles so that the Armed Forces can force Su-34s to launch IPC/UMPK beyond their effective range. Read: more than 60 km from the front line.
Speaking further about defense against attack by gliders, I have to disagree with those who believe that the F-16s can be the solution to this problem.
The front line in Ukraine - whether on the ground or in the sky - is huge. PSU would have to purchase many F-16s to have, say, at least 4-8 aircraft in the air at any time of day for a quick — or at least timely — response to Russian attacks using glider bombs.
As explained in my analysis of the F-16, the main air-to-air weapon - the AIM-120C - has too little range to hit, for example, an approaching Su-34 from a distance of more than 50 km.
In fact, to get that range of fire with the AIM-120C, the F-16 would have to operate at high altitudes (5000 m or more), which in turn would make it completely vulnerable to
a) Russian manned interceptors equipped with P-37M long-range air-to-air missiles (such as Su-35 and MiG-31), or
b) in front of such Russian long-range surface-to-air missiles as the S-400.
In other words, the F-16 is not the solution. At least until there are more than 100 units in Ukraine. Meteorological EF-2000 or Rafales may be one of them, but even then: Ukraine will still have to get them in large numbers to become able to effectively counter the advancing Russian Su-34s in all areas of the front.
It's just that RKs have their advantages over interceptor fighters - especially limited ones like the F-16. The main one is that air defense systems can stay in the combat zone much longer than any manned interceptors. Provided, of course, that all provided RKs survive, remaining in the combat zone, and are not destroyed by the enemy.
The text is published with the permission of the author. For the first time published by link.
