The last few days, several readers (interestingly: all of them from ‘the West’) have asked me for something like ‘softening’ of my critique of the Ukrainian political leadership, the Commander-in-Chief (CinC) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the Ukrainian General Staff (GenStab-U) in particular.

Have thought of this, and then a lot. My conclusion is rather simple: sorry, I can’t.

It’s not that I’m unkind, or want to disappoint, or must be a maverick, or know better, or whatever of that sort, but: I simply can’t.

I’ve learned – and very early in my life, at that – that the only way forward is through never-ending process of critical reviews. That’s the way I’m analysing warfare, too. I’ve learned to prefer realism to any kind of science fiction, wishful thinking or modelling reality. So much so, I couldn’t any other while I was still working with dozens of different daily newspapers, or specialised magazines. Which, eventually, led to me quitting to work with all of them, over a decade ago.

I do not say everything I ‘report’, and every of my analysis is ‘right on money’. Far from that. But, I can always say my conscience is clear and I haven’t left myself get corrupted by outside influences: I do strive to objectively assess intentions and capabilities through maintaining the necessary dose of objectivity and realism.

To become capable of doing that, I’m taking care to understand the backgrounds and context first; I’m constantly updating my insights in this regards; and, I’m constantly constantly cross-checking, and re-cross-checking again, learning new things and adapting my conclusions correspondingly. Sorry but: results of this process are the way they are.

I understand, this is often making me appear as if playing the ‘Devil’s advocate’, even ‘taking sides for the enemy’ etc. But, that’s the part of my way of thinking: after all, one of crucial things about modern warfare is to understand how is what party ‘ticking’.

Point is: I never know what are the results of my analysis going to be. I’m ‘spontaneous’ in this regards and thus can never ‘promise’ somebody, ‘OK, henceforth, I’m going to analyse and draw conclusions enthusiastically’, or ‘sure, I’m now going to write nicely about person XY’ – because when I sit down to analyse and write, I nave have no idea if there is going to be a reason to do so.

Thus, sorry: I can’t help if the results of my analysis are something somebody does not like, nor am I going to fiddle with my conclusions and model them to what somebody might ‘like’.

Is that confusing some of readers? Obviously: it is. Especially people expecting to read what they want to read; at least as often for people jumping to conclusions, not reading at all, gauging by titles, or not comprehending what they read. They’re going to remain confused for the time of their life. Those having problems with my sarcasm – even more so. But then, please keep in mind: if you want somebody lying to you, so you would feel better, or whatever: sorry, there’s nothing to read on this blog.

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I’ve started with this ‘disclaimer’ because the last few days have had a few chats with several friends, colleagues, and contacts about the war in Ukraine. The following is something like an attempt at putting resulting conclusions – their and mine – to a paper. Right now, it’s no perfectly organised feature: rather ‘lots of food for (additional) thoughts’. It might even have a ‘hole’ (or few more) in different places, too.

Call it a ‘working paper’ if you like: I do think it’s going to do relatively well in explaining what went well – and the mass of things that went wrong in this war, so far.

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For the Start…

As of February 2022, the peace-time ZSU had about 200,000 personnel assigned to combat formations of its ground forces. One can now argue about how many of them were professionals, how many recruits, if they were better trained, or not, and sufficient or insufficient for facing the Russian onslaught.

However, that was not the actual problem: the actual problem of the ZSU in February 2022 was a government that stubbornly refused to accept reality, and thus ‘didn’t believe’ the Russians would invade. Almost until it was too late. Correspondingly, the mobilisation of reserves and bringing units into position was launched too late and, except along the former ‘Line of Control’ (LOC; the frontline frozen since 2014-2015), the Russian invasion caught the ZSU in same fashion it caught the PSU (Air Force and Air Defence Force): unprepared.

What’s worse, Generals like Sodol have screwed up in the south, letting the Russians secure Kherson and Melitopol, reach Mykolaiv and then try reaching Odesa, while driving into the rear of the defences of Mariupol. Thus, large parts of Ukraine fell without much fighting, Mariupol was besieged in a matter of days, the ZSU and the PSU lost at least two-, if not four or five brigades worth in troops without much fighting, and they suddenly had to operate along a frontline of nearly 1,500km.

Arguably, the first mobilisation was initiated on 19 February, activating the Operational Reserve I and, three days later, the Operational Reserve II. Already by the end of March, this beefed the total to around 400,000 troops. Is also the reason why the Russians began losing ground (for example in the Mykolaiv area), and then withdrew from Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy. Fact is: by around May 2022, the ZSU had more troops than the VSRF in Ukraine.

However, because both its field commanders (i.e. brigade- and battalion commanders, but especially lower ranks) and troops were skilled and eager to fight, they did much better than anybody would have ever expected. For the first four months of the Russian invasion, they largely operated in flexible fashion. Except in north-western Kyiv, and in Mariupol, they rarely engaged in trench warfare: instead, they were constantly manoeuvring around the Russian flanks, ambushing and/or counterattacking where the Russians expected this the least. Of course, one could say that the ZSU was ‘trading terrain for time’, but: it worked. Regardless if in Chernihiv, Sumy, central and then western Luhansk, eastern Kharkiv, in the Izyum-Lyman-Siversk area, or in Kherson and Mykolaiv, the Ukrainians were causing the VSRF immense losses, while losing relatively few of own troops.

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Show Battles

Sole exceptions from this rule were areas where the ZSU received an order from above not to withdraw. See ‘political decisions’, resulting in ‘show for the zombie idiots in the West’- and ‘no step back’-type of orders and battles.

For example, Kyiv in late February and early March 2022. Whether Zelensky or any of his advisors, not sure right now, considered it ‘better’ to defend Moshchun at any price, than to let the Russians become bogged down while trying to reach the city. Zaluzhny, the CinC ZSU, didn’t complain against this order (if at all, he was always complaining post-factum), nor did Syrsky (at the time, commander of ground forces), do so. Result: they had no options but the leave the 72^nd at its own devices. As a result, the brigade had to hold out in Moshchun ‘regardless the price’, losing one infantry battalion and most of its artillery while trying to halt assaults by two divisions of the VDV.

Not that the 72^nd didn’t put up a fight: oh yes, it did, and what for one. Between others, it smashed at least three regiments of the ‘crack’ VDV. However, what actually saved the day in Moshchun was flooding by mining a dam on the Dnipro Reservoir – which, actually, could’ve been done right at the start of the war, on a timely order from the top of the ZSU and thus avoiding losses of the 72^nd - but, was repeatedly botched up.

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No Step Back

The leadership in Kyiv didn’t learn its lessons from this.

On the contrary. For generals in Kyiv it didn’t matter how well their troops have fought; it didn’t matter what kind of clever ideas for counterattacks their field commanders might have; nor what opportunities were the Russians offering by their headless assaults (usually ordered by Putin in person). They only cared about how many battalions they’ve had, and how many of troops, vehicles, and supplies they could throw upon the Russians. Because ‘material battles’ and ‘battles of attrition’ was the only way they could think.

Therefore, the top brass in Kyiv could never consider the original 200,000 ZSU troops for enough, now could it come to the idea that a total of 400,000 troops available through mobilisations of the Operational Reserves I and II, might be enough. They had to have much more.

Moreover, and tragically, feeling himself ‘confirmed’ that his ‘no step back’-orders are ‘working’, Zelensky continued issuing ever more of the same. For example, at the time in the Izyum-Lyman-Siversk area the ZSU continued ‘dancing around the Russians’ (that was through April, May, and June 2022), mauling one of their combined arms armies (not just BTGs) after the other, in the case of Popasna, Severodonetsk and Lysychansk, Zelensky ordered ‘no step back’.

With this, he’s enabled the Russians to pin down multiple ZSU brigades and subject them to weeks-long air strikes, artillery and flanking attacks. Result: the involved ZSU units – starting with the 24^th Mech (in Popasna) – were fully exposed to the Russian fire-power, and defeated. One after the other. What’s worse: actually, in each of these cases, the ZSU losses were never ‘heavy’ until the last 2-3 days of each of these battles, when troops were forced to – belatedly – withdraw from ‘cauldrons’, created when the Russians broke through around their flanks.  

So, instead of learning a host of other lessons about the ZSU (like that it’s not going to ‘collapse’, as widely expected, and regardless to what pressure is it subjected), both the political and the military leadership learned wrong lessons again. They’ve learned to order units to hold positions no matter what, and then they’ve learned to ‘wash their hands in innocence’ – because the final decision to withdraw was taken by local commanders, through ‘disobeying orders’. Any kind of complaints about commanding style were explained away with ‘after the war’… because they fell for an illusion that the war will soon be over…

Actually: at least by that point in time, the ZSU – i.e. Zaluzhny (CinC ZSU at the time), Syrsky, and the GenStab-U – should have learned that ‘no step back’ is the worst idea, alone because the Russians could always continue wasting dozens of thousands of troops to get this or that place, or around it, and because such ‘last ditch operations’ were exposing the ZSU to all the fire-power the Russians could put together.

Instead, until today I do not know about a single case of anybody there within the ZSU going to Zelensky and telling him how ridiculous are his orders.

Worst of all: because the GenStab-U has never adapted its procedures (i.e. doctrine), the ZSU has no practice of ‘learning lessons’ (i.e. reviewing its combat experiences in after-action de-briefs), and such lessons were ignored even internally. Because already Zaluzhny was hesitant (and/or became exhausted) with explaining what he wants (he did excel in complaining what he did not want, but always post-factum), while the ground troops were already under the command of ‘yes-sayer’ Syrsky, the ZSU continued following Zelensky’s pointless and counterproductive ‘no step back’ orders.

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Accidental Successes

As next, both Zelensky and Syrsky made their next mistake: probably because of Zelensky’s ideas about ‘impressing the West by showing how keen are Ukrainians to fight’, in early September 2022 they’ve launched an offensive.

In Kherson.

Nowadays, that operation is something like, ‘oh, please switch to another topic; I do not want to talk about that’ – for the Ukrainian leadership. Therefore, it’s not discussed even by the media.

Preparing his plan in best traditions of Soviet military arts (thus making it easily predictable for the Russians), Sodol enthusiastically sent several inexperienced brigades to assault well-fortified VDV and combat experienced DPR and LPR troops. Sure, there were some adaptations of the tactics, on basis of early experiences but, in grand total: Supported by plentiful artillery and everything the VKS could provide, the Russians smashed much of this effort. What a surprise that after 2-3 days this proved to be a bloody fiasco. However, the offensive was not stopped: instead, Syrsky and Sodol continued bolstering a failure by repeated attempts to break out of the Davidiv Bryd bridgehead…

…and then they, belatedly, ‘continued that offensive’ with help of M142 HIMARS and long-range artillery, until the Russians couldn’t keep their troops on the right bank of Dnipro resupplied any more, and decided to withdraw, in November of that year.

…which is why that offensive ‘ended in success’, and Kherson (city) was liberated.

Meanwhile, to the luck of Ukraine, and rather by accident that design, somebody (I have a feeling, until today it remains unclear who) came up with that idea for a counteroffensive in eastern Kharkiv. What worked there was the fact that the Keystone Cops moved the mass of their reserves to Kherson, and were dumb enough to leave no intervention formations behind their frontline. Thus, an attack by only a few of Ukrainian motorised battalions ripped open the Russian lines and then led to their collapse. In a matter of two weeks, the Ukrainians were already east of Oskil River, and the 1^st Guards Tanks Army encircled and forced to fall back from Izyum while leaving most of its heavy equipment behind. As much as this was great, after three weeks of ‘racing east’, the involved ZSU units then literally run out of steam: they were completely exhausted, because Syrsky/GenStab-U were slow in feeding reinforcements to this sector: they were still busy bolstering Sodol’s failure in Kherson.

All of which was playing straight into the Russian hands, because Pudding launched a mobilisation and the Keystone Cops in Moscow promptly began throwing dozens of thousands of poorly-trained mobiks in the way of the Ukrainian advance into western Luhansk. Unsurprisingly, the latter stopped short of reaching Svatove and Kremina, which would have been decisive…

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Obsession with Battalions

All through my career as analyst of modern warfare, I’ve encountered a lot of what I call ‘obsession with battalions’. See: no matter where, the mass of strategists and commentators seem to be obsessed with battalion-sized formations. Especially professional military officers are frequently ignoring the number of divisions or brigades: all they care about is how many battalions are around. Goes so far there is a saying like, ‘one crisis (or battle) – one battalion’… Have experienced quite a lot of such behaviour, time and again, and regardless in what armed force. Me thinks, Syrsky (and the GenStab-U) very much belong to such officers: they’re ‘fighting this war in battalions’, and nothing else matters to them.

This might appear ‘not related’ at first, but it is explaining a lot of what happened as next.

The mobilisation of the Ukrainian Operational Reserves I and II resulted in the majority of ZSU brigades growing very large. Already by June-July 2022, several had up to 20 or even more infantry/rifle battalions. And if not, they were ‘beefed up’ through addition of multiple battalions of Territorial Defence. Furthermore, early successes in Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, and then in eastern Kharkiv have resulted in the capture of so many Russian tanks, artillery pieces and other heavy arms, that these brigades were also properly armed. Nicest part of it: as long as all elements of one brigade were kept together, the chain of command was working at least ‘reasonably well’.

However, the GenStab-U couldn’t care less about brigades, or (de-facto) divisions. It only cared about the number of battalions. It also never came to the idea to grant any of such ‘big brigades’ the time necessary to transfer their know-how to new, recently mobilised and inexperienced troops. Instead, it began ‘cannibalising’ them: it began establishing new units through a combination of combat-experienced cadre (indeed, often ‘the best’ officers and other ranks) drawn from existing battalions and brigades, with mobilised troops, the mass of whom was never properly trained. What’s worse: because it had ‘lots of surplus generals and colonels’ left over from the Soviet times (the Soviet Army was ‘colonel/general-heavy’ precisely because it had to have a huge number of these, so it could command lots of units when fully mobilised) it began appointing these in command of newly-created battalions and brigades. ‘By sheer accident’, of course, many of newly-appointed commanders were (and still are) Syrsky’s buddies whom he owned different favours. If not, they were then ‘parked’: assigned to headquarters of ‘Groups of Forces’, nominally in control over dozens of brigades (see ‘OSGs’ and ‘OTGs’ like Tavriya, and Odesa), but actually having no executive powers at all.

As a result, existing units – already weakened by losses they have suffered while slowing down and then stopping multiple early Russian offensives – were weakened even more. Already by autumn 2022, many of them were down to 30-40% of their nominal strength. They still had to hold the same sectors of the frontline like before, though. What a surprise a number of such brigades never recovered until this very day: they’re existent in something like ‘2-3 battalion’ strength and, literally, ‘vegetating at different corners of the frontline’. At most, we get to hear about them when their incompetent novice commanders screw up, and then the Russians punch at some unexpected sector…

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Home-made Illusions

For a while at least, this appeared as ‘doesn’t matter’. Because of their collapse in eastern Kharkiv, followed by – relatively – ‘easy’ liberation of Lyman, and then the withdrawal from Kherson, the Russians appeared so weak, that the illusion was created that ‘if the Ukrainians give them another hard push, they’re collapse and run away’. Indeed, the illusion was created that the war could be ended with one, big push. That’s what led to the idea for a ‘big offensive in 2023’.

Zelensky then convinced different of zombie idiots in ‘the West’ about this idea and, as of late 2022 and early 2023, ‘the West’ pledged what appeared to be ‘some serious amounts of heavy weaponry’, necessary to equip yet additional new units, which would then be deployed in such an operation.

However, while Zelensky and (at least) Syrsky (not sure about Zaluzhny, or how much was he a ‘factor’ any more) were planning in short terms, Pudding and the Keystone Cops in Moscow began planning in long terms.

1.)    Shocked by the loss of eastern Kharkiv, in September 2022 Pudding launched mobilisation in Russia. From that time onwards, the situation was that of a ‘race against the time’, the essence of which was: can the ZSU kill more VSRF troops per month, than the VSRF was mobilising and deploying to the front. Already the fighting in the Lyman area of October 2022 has provided a crystal-clear answer in this regards: yes, the ZSU liberated the place, but couldn’t continue advancing on Svatove and Kremina because the Russians were pumping literal dozens of thousands of troops into its way, and sending these in ever additional counterattacks.

2.)    Meanwhile, realising the ZSU’s superiority in mobile warfare, Surovikin launched the construction of deep minefields and massive fortifications to prevent another ‘eastern Kharkiv’, and, finally,

3.)    Pudding ordered the Wagner PMC to assault Bakhmut, to buy yet more time for his mobilisation to start having serious effects.

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Distorted Reality

With other words, and as absurd as this is likely to sound at first: whether they admit it or not, but, from September-October 2022, Pudding and his Keystone Cops started considering Ukraine and the ZSU a ‘serious opponent’. They took corresponding decisions (indeed, the Keystone Cops went as far as to start adapting not only their doctrine and strategy, but even tactics, through introduction of new tactical manuals for their field officers).

And that around the same time Zelensky and the ZSU de-facto stopped considering the VSRF for a ‘serious opponent’. At least for a while…

Moreover, with hindsight, it cannot but be concluded that the GenStab-U’s idea for creating dozens  of new brigades was a bad one. Indeed, Bakhmut fell precisely because of a problem resulting from that idea: an experienced brigade was rotated out of heavily fortified Soledar (where it held out for half a year) and was replaced by an inexperienced one. The Russians hit at the moment of rotation and the new brigade run away. Then the ZSU squandered several battalions in belated counterattacks…and with the fall of Soledar the way for the Russians into Bakhmut was open…

What happened as next can only be described as the worst imaginable combination of Zelensky’s illusions (especially the one about ‘keeping the zombie idiots in the West happy’), his ‘no step back’ politics, and Syrsky’s practice of ‘patching up the frontline by single battalions’. Yes, sure, the ZSU was smashing Wagner PMC’s convicts by hundreds, all over Bakhmut. However, it could’ve done much better, wasn’t it for Syrsky feeding ever additional battalions from entirely different brigades into the garrison (instead of sending complete brigades there) – in turn creating a complete chaos, in which ZSU units were often shooting at each other, or marching into positions already taken by the Russians because of miscommunications.

This was little else but a recipe for another disaster: once it was clear the town was lost, Zelensky ordered some of best remaining ZSU brigades into Bakhmut. Once again, and just like in Popasna, in Severodonetsk, and in Lysychansk, the ZSU suffered its worst losses during the final days of the battle, while trying to withdraw survivors out of the resulting cauldron…

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Usual Excuses

As usually, official explanation was on hand: ‘had to be done, otherwise the Russians would drive to Chasiv Yar and then…well… all the way to Kyiv’…  

Actually, this was nonsense: by the end of the Battle of Bakhmut, Wagner PMC’s convicts were spent and had to be replaced by VDV. With other words: somebody there - probabyl the SBU - didn’t do his/her homework: Kyiv thus did not know that because so much of the VDV was mauled early during the war, the Keystone Cops became extremely reluctant in wasting such units for assault purposes (except for such ‘interventions’, like in this September, when trying to slow down the Ukrainian push directly on Glushkovo).

Nevertheless, decisions based on delusions and wishful thinking just went on.

As next, on Zelensky’s order, Syrsky and the GenStab-U set in motion the plan for the ‘big counteroffensive (to Tokmak and then the Azov Sea)’. Worst of all: the plan for this was drawn in autumn 2022, around the time Lyman was liberated. At that time, it is likely that it would have worked, too, because the VSRF in southern Zaporizhzhya was in tatters and had no fortifications nor anything like ‘defence in depth’. Plus, the mass of Russian reinforcements (especially VDV) were in Kherson.

However, this plan was not adjusted over the following 8-9 months: no idea if it was the SBU or the ZSU’s own field intelligence that screwed up, or that perfect combination of incompetents in Kyiv, but: nobody within the top brass of the ZSU took into consideration the extension of minefields and fortifications meanwhile constructed on Surovikin’s order. Moreover, the West failed to deliver the artillery rockets and shells it pledged it would deliver. Thus, the ZSU was not able to prepare the coming offensive by striking Russian headquarters and supply depots on time (before the actual assault), nor by ‘softening’ their defence lines: it started doing that only 2-3 weeks into the offensive…

…and, in the months before that offensive, the ZSU has lost some of its best troops in Bakhmut, too…

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Bolstering a Failure

The ‘big’ Ukrainian offensive in the south was initiated on basis of an obsolete plan; it received minimal air- and artillery support, and then involved newly-established, inexperienced brigades. What a surprise the latter were mauled, one after the other. Several were heavily hit by the Russians just while organising themselves for their assaults, still kilometres behind the frontline. And that’s not to talk about the losses they all have suffered while grinding through 10-15km deep minefields.

As it turned out ever since, it was in a matter of two days after that offensive was launched that Syrsky – and thus Zaluzhny and Zelensky – knew the offensive was a failure.

What did they do?

Against the most fundamental principle of warfare (see: ‘never bolster a failure’), they’ve all decided to continue bolstering a failure: have switched over to infantry attacks, ‘instead’, and continued doing that even once they must have known they can’t achieve anything at all. Indeed, Zelensky continued insisting on ever additional assaults well into September and then into October 2023, by when even the second and then the third ‘wave’ of newly-established units was completely exhausted…

Arguably, the ZSU mauled a total of some six Russian divisions in the process. However, it didn’t manage to breach the Russian frontline and, in grand total, the number of Russian losses didn’t matter in the long term, because after initial chaos the Russian mobilisation was ‘producing’ more troops every month than the ZSU could kill. With other words: even after all the losses in summer the last year, the VSRF came out stronger than before…

What a surprise then, the VSRF was capable of stopping Zelensky’s tragicomedy with its own offensive on Avdiivka.  

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NATO’s Business Model

Interestingly, the Russian offensive on Avdiivka was launched just around the same time the USA completely stopped shipping artillery ammunition to Ukraine and the Trio Fantasticus in the White House – and that despite a clear decision of all of NATO from September last year – entirely re-focused on ‘saving Israel’. For the next six months Ukraine got next to nothing from the USA.

And what the EU was sending was simply not enough, because the zombie idiots in Brussel, Berlin, Paris and similar places do not comprehend the importance of this war until this very day. Like for Americans, for them, it’s a ‘business model’: get rid of old arms by making Ukraine happy; let your buddies earn some money through overhauling that old stuff so the Ukrainians get ‘something operational’; but, and even more so, let your buddies and sponsors earn much more money though buying super-turbo new equipment for own armed forces… which is then explained with such ridiculous ideas like ‘Pudding ante portas… in 2030 or who knows when’…

With other words: ‘the West’ began bolstering its own failures, too – which ‘the West’ can afford, as obvious from that ‘the West’ remaining unimpressed even by the loss of every single war it fought, the last 20+ years. Because losing wars is also a business model in ‘the West’. See: fight wars for profit, not to win, and then so to squander trillions of taxpayers money by laundering this into pockets of ‘sponsors’, and that for years.

…and then, faithfully along Zelensky’s ‘no step back’ doctrine, the 110^th Mech in Avdiivka held out, and held out, and held out, and held out, and held out… for months without respite. What was Syrsky’s sole solution? Re-deploy the 47^th Mech, already battered from trying to ram through the Russian fortifications in the south, to this sector. Once again, serious reinforcements were deployed to Avdiivka only once it became crystal clear that what was left of the garrison has to withdraw. And, once again, the ZSU suffered its worst losses in that battle only during the last few days.

….and, as usually, nobody in Kyiv learned any kind of lessons. At most, Zelensky fired Zaluzny and replaced him precisely by the general who was screwing up all the time: Syrsky.

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From Hero to Zero

When one puts all of this together, results are not the least surprising. ‘The West’ was meanwhile ‘deeply impressed’ by Ukraine – but because Zelensky was promising a lot, announcing even more, but ‘didn’t deliver’. Because he had no other strategy but to milk Washington, Berlin, London, and Paris for more weapons. Alas, his ‘driving the Russians into the Sea’ didn’t work. And because of Syrsky’s resistance to any kind of advice. For zombie idiots in ‘the West’, that’s equal to ‘betrayal’: for them, the two characters in Kyiv are meanwhile marked as ‘incompetent babblers that can’t’, which is ‘bad for our standing in the pools’.

(And, please mind, dear Ukrainians that might come to complain now: whether there are so many incompetent, defeatist, even pro-Pudding generals in NATO, as there are in Ukraine – simply does not matter. The countries in question are already members in that ‘exclusive club’, and therefore the quality of their top brass is irrelevant. On the contrary: ‘Ukraine first must prove itself’. And, thanks to its leadership, it’s continuously failing to do so.)

What a surprise, ‘the West’, de-facto, stopped paying attention at ever additional of Ukrainian requests for more arms, for permission to strike into Russia with Western weapons etc. Why should they follow advice and support requests from characters that ‘can’t’? Since around March this year, Ukraine can only expect limited financial support from the EU, and on/off deliveries of artillery shells – also from the USA. And yes, multiple EU-members of NATO are going to junk their F-16s and Mirage 2000s upon it. …and even that, solely because the EU has concluded that this is the cheapest way of ‘supporting’ Ukraine, while its business model is working so nice. This time thanks to providing interests from the Russian money frozen on western banks – in form of loans, which Kyiv then has to pay back.

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Absurdities

Meanwhile, establishing ever additional battalions and organising these into ever new brigades became one of most-eagerly-pursued hobbies of Syrsky and his GenStab-U. Because ever more of buddies are happy, favours returned, and – the more buddies are involved – there is ever more opportunity for pocketing bribes and favours.

If they’ve created some 40+ brigades through 2022 and into 2023, over the last year they’ve created at least 20, perhaps even 30 additional ones – and that although meanwhile fully aware of the fact there is no trace of chance newly-established units might ever be properly equipped. Indeed: it’s out of question that ‘the West’ might ever deliver heavy arms necessary to equip all of new brigades (even less so all the artillery and other ammunition necessary).  

(…in other cases, the West pledged to deliver, then didn’t, then did deliver some, but months later than announced… and so it happened, for example, several new brigades were established as ‘Mechanised’, then re-designated as ‘Infantry’, and then, finally, emerged at the frontlines as ‘Mechanised’…)

Actually, not only all the newly-established units, but even the existing ones are all critically short already on utility vehicles (see: SUVs). Not to talk about armoured vehicles and artillery. Sure, many laymen are going to point out their ‘mechanised’ components have received lots of Western MRAPs. And, no doubt, MRAPs are relatively cheap vehicles, offering reasonable doses of protection, while easy to manufacture in big numbers – especially by companies of different ‘buddies’ of ‘VIP’ zombie idiots. As a result, nowadays, they represent the mass of ‘armoured’ vehicles supplied to Ukraine by ‘the West’, or even made in Ukraine.

However, MRAP stands for ‘mine-resistant, ambush-protected’ – but not for ‘armoured personnel carrier’, especially nor for ‘infantry fighting vehicle’, and surely not for ‘tank’. Of course, their manufacturers are praising their MRAPs, but, ask people who have designed such vehicles and the first thing they are going to emphasise is that these are not made for more but to provide protected transportation for infantry, or to haul ammo and supplies to the troops engaged in combat. MRAPs are not made to be used as assault vehicles. Neither in offensive nor in defensive operations. That’s why they are MRAPs, no IFVs, not even APCs.

With other words: all of these newly-established ‘mechanised’ (battalions and) brigades of the ZSU can, at best, be described as ‘motorised’, but surely not ‘mechanised’.

Foremost, the mass of such units are sent into trenches, to defend Ukraine from relentless Russian assaults. Into scenarios in which their MRAPs are of little use. Both these newly-established-, and the few re-built old brigades are not deployed for manoeuvring warfare. Because of Zelensky’s ‘no step back’ orders, the ZSU is nowadays spending 99% of its time fighting battles of attrition against an opponent who can afford attrition.  

…and this process is repeated, and repeated, and repeated, again and again…and impression is like if nobody could explain why, nor has a solution on hand…

With other words: this cannot but be described as another process of bolstering a failure. Indeed: bolstering failures to absurd levels.

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…and yet more Absurdities

As if all of this would not be enough, the latest ‘gem’ is this Zelensky’s ‘peace plan’. Turned out this is based on all the possible ideas NATO has already turned down. See: Ukraine joining NATO, NATO permitting strikes deep inside Russia by Western-made weapons, joint air defence of the Ukrainian skies, etc.

I mean: what idiot must anybody there in Kyiv be to come up with precisely the set of ideas that have already been turned down, and then expect NATO to change its mind? Where is such a decisionmaker coming from? The Dreamland? This is would be ridiculous even if anybody would try to use it as a script for some TV-comedy…

***

Conclusions

Back in 2022, the ZSU was not successful in smashing the Russian all-out invasion because of ‘brilliant and beloved’ Zaluzhny, but because its 200,000, then 400,000 troops were still led by officers that knew their job and were free to act along their experiences. Correspondingly, they were also free to let their troops fighting the Russians the way they best can: with skill and gusto. ‘These people’ have destroyed the VSRF: they’ve achieved something no Ukrainian generals, and certainly no Zelensky has achieved. However, up to 50% of ‘these people’ are manwhile gone: either killed or invalided out of service.

Since 2023, the ZSU is unsuccessful precisely because of its generals, and because of Zelensky. Because its ‘leaders’ are no ‘leaders’ but a gang of incompetents lacking ideas and solutions – but experts in staging TV- and social media appearances, in ‘disciplining’ and micromanagement. This is going so far that considering all of the incompetence, failures, illusions, fantasies, corruption and nepotism in Kyiv, one might be surprised the ZSU is ‘still holding out’. However, it still is - thanks to skills of some of its lower-ranking commanders, and hundreds of thousands of its troops that continue fighting, no matter what.

Conclusions are therefore on hand (indeed: ‘crystal clear’):

1.)    Ukraine needs political leadership that is mercilessly objective, super-critical of itself, capable of reforming itself and the country through developing and applying realistic and reasonable doctrines and strategies. The current one is none of that: the current one is living in illusions and overdependent on help from abroad (which is never going to be provided). As such, it is more likely to, literally, sell the country (or indebt it for about a century in advance) than anything else.

2.)    The ZSU needs military leadership that’s not after doing favours to the political leadership, or each other, establishing and securing own positions and pocketing bribes, but having innovative solutions making it capable of fighting and winning this war through operating with less troops, less arms, and less supplies than the opponent. Foremost: that leadership must be capable of starting by reforming its current structures to the bone, and then the entire force: developing a new doctrine to re-train the officer corps and complete units, and of finding and adapting modern technologies. The current one is none of that: the current Ukrainian military leadership is proven as unable of doing anything but what the Soviet Army generals were doing 40-80 years ago.

3.)    Ukraine needs both political- and military leadership that is accountable, where ‘heads are rolling’ (i.e. people get fired) when one or both bodies are screwing up as much as they are screwing up since early 2023. Pronto. On the spot and without any of (meanwhile) usual excuses, ‘official investigations’, hesitance or delays. Currently, it has none of that. The Zelensky Admin is unaccountable to anybody but several oligarchs that brought it in power, while the CinC is accountable to Zelensky only, but the latter is holding him in position because he’s saying yes to every of president’s illusions (probably falling for the same, too). Thus, and essentially, they are accountable to each other, instead to ‘the people’ of Ukraine.  

4.)    Excuses like ‘Ukraine has too few men in age 19-21’ to mobilise and send to war are BS. It has enough to defeat Russia (and it has not only men, but also women of that age) – provided these are properly trained, equipped and – especially – properly commanded. The issue is of mobilising, motivating, and then properly deploying the available ‘manpower’: that’s within responsibility of a government - provided this would be doing its job, which it isn’t. Vice versa: with current leadership, Ukraine couldn’t win this war even if mobilising 10 million of troops. Because its current leadership has no idea how to mobilise and organise the entire society and economy, nor is it interested in finding commanders that can win this war. The current leadership has only managed to ruin even its reputation for begging for help from the West, while its generals are excelling in squandering meagre resources in massive battles of attrition (or failures they have created, and then bolstered), getting rid of unpleasant subordinates through ordering them into idiotic frontal counterattacks, and pocketing bribes at every opportunity.

Overall (and I’m the first to be ‘unhappy’ by this ‘unpleasant’ conclusion): sorry, but, Ukraine needs new leadership, and a complete, top-to-bottom reform of its governance and armed forces.

The text is published with the permission of the author. First published here.