The last few weeks, I was busy finalising my next book. By accident (please mind that projects of this kind are always planned some two or three years in advance), the book in question is the Volume 2 of a project about naval warfare between Iran and Iraq,back in the 1980s. While working on it, I could not escape lots of déjà vu impressions: which is why this, perhaps some other of my analyses that are to follow, might appear ‘coloured’ in this regards. However, for me it’s really so that the more I study both the ongoing war in Ukraine and the war between Iran and Iraq (which, meanwhile, and thanks to cooperation with Sirous Ebrahimi, a veteran of that conflict, and a very skilled researcher, is possible to do with help of official documentation) the more parallels I find. But, more about this a bit later on, when I move ‘into specific details’.

As next… and feel free to call me strange if you like (really: no problem), but I’m of that kind: when everybody is focusing their attention on one issue, I’m looking in all the other possible directions. Thus, while many are excited about reports about additional Ukrainian UAV-strikes on the Russian oil/gas-sector, I’ll address that issue later on. The same is valid with reports about operations of (meanwhile) three different groups of Russian ‘opposition forces’ controlled by Ukraine, along the borders to Russia.

Instead, I’ll start with some analysis of what the Russians seem to be planning for this year, and few of the latest news from the battlefields inside Ukraine.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The last two weeks, the VSRF has run a reorganisation of two of its major, operational-level groups of forces in Ukraine. Essentially, the area of responsibility of the Group Zapad (West) was stretched into the area previously controlled by the Group Tsentr(Centre). Moreover, the Group Zapad is now responsible for countering the operations of the Ukraine-controlled armed Russian opposition on the territories of the Russian Federation, too (see: Belgorod Oblast).

In turn, the Group Tsentr seems to now be entirely focusing on what is slowly transpiring to be the ‘primary Russian aim for 2024’. For your orientation, here a good map of the major Russian dispositions, as prepared by Pasi Paroinen:

Now… well… what am I talking about?

To understand this, mind the following paradox: while Putin is obsessed with denying Ukraine’s right to exist, he’s also obsessed with ‘borders’. So also inner-Ukrainian borders: those between different oblasts (is plural from Ukrainian for ‘region’ or ‘province’, whichever you prefer). The current situation in this regards is something like this:

Means: in order to fulfill his (meanwhile) ‘Strategic Plan N’ (because the mass of Strategic Plans A to M has failed over the last two years), and in grand total, he expects that the VSRF (Armed Forces of the Russian Federation) ‘must’ secure all of Luhansk, all of Donetsk, all of Zaporizhzhya, and all of Kherson Oblasts.

Currently, they’re controlling over 98% of Luhansk, ‘but only’ some 70% of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhya, and Kherson, each.

Thus, the question is what to ‘liberate’ as next?

For considering that ‘next’, please mind that the officers of the Russian GenStab (essentially: people planning all the major VSRF operations) are working in a very systemic fashion. No matter in what fashion is that plan then pursued, i.e. realised (or not), there’s always a very detailed plan for whatever they intend to do: they, really, ‘do not go to a toilette without a plan’. And so, for this year, they seem to have calculated something along the following lines:

-          They would like to capture Kupyansk again, but can’t.

-          Foremost: Kupyansk is already outside Luhansk, and thus no priority.

-          They would like to capture Lyman (or ‘Krasny Lyman’, as they call it)…if for no other reason, then because they would like to remove the shame for their defeat in that area, back in September-October 2022…. But, can’t do so without securing Kupyansk first, and that is no priority.

-          The Russians would love capturing Slovyansk and Kramatorsk, but the only way to these two towns is the one from the north, via Kupyansk and Lyman. However, as their experiences from the last 1,5 years have shown, that’s not working. Plus, and once again: Kupyansk and Lyman are no priority.

(….all of which is why I never ‘believed’ all the ‘concerns’ about some ‘biiiiig’ Russian winter offensive in the Kupyansk direction, with the aim of continuing all the way to Kharkiv…)

-          In the south, and pending the construction of that railway line that is going to connect Donetsk with Mariupol and then the southern Zaporizhzhya (thus bolstering the ‘land bridge into southern Ukraine), there is no reason to attack just yet.

With other words: currently, these ‘northern-’ and ‘southern’ options are out of question.

As next, please mind that, regardless what kind of forces – what kind of units, equipment, and troops – they have at their disposal, or at what level are they planning and conducting the operations in question, the everlasting ideal of a battle for any decent officer of the GenStab VSRF is that of the Prussian-style ‘Kesselschlacht’(Cauldron). See: pincer attack, aiming to envelop the area of interest. Ideally, they would do that in form of massive mechanised assaults, supported by all the artillery they can get, and relatively quickly. But, in this war, this is not working, and thus, they’re now pursuing the same strategy by other means: in form of constant ‘minor’ assaults of their infantry-dominated assault groups, securing field after field, and village after village…

Based on the above-listed, one can deduct that for this year the Russians have opted for the ‘centre solution’: advances in direction of Kostyantinivika and Pokrovsk, with the aim of enveloping the mining area of Toretsk.

And because of this, lately, they have pushed so hard in two major directions:

-          Bakhmut, or ‘Northern Axis’, by the Group Zapad: assaults in direction of Chasiv Yar (see Bohdanivka and Ivanivkse)

-          Avdiivka-Shakhtarsk or ‘Central Axis’, by the Group Tsentr: assaults west of Avdiivka, in direction of the new ZSU defence line.

With other words, the GenStab’s overall aim for 2024 is something like this:

1.)    The ‘conclusion’ of the ‘liberation’ of Luhansk, Donetsk and northern Zaporizhzhya, with emphasis on

2.)    ‘liberation’ of Donetsk.

….and that is where the VSRF is assaulting already since October the last year, and ever since. The latest ‘news from the battlefields’ are corresponding, too.

BATTLE OF DONBASS

Kupyansk-Svatove… was ‘quiet’, the last few days.

Kremina… few Russian assaults in direction of Torske, ‘nothing special’.

Bakhmut… the Russians are pushing hard into Ivanivske, might have made some gains towards the centre of the village.

Avdiivka-Shakhtarsk… the Russians are advancing once again. Foremost thanks to MPK/UMPK glide bombs, which are pulverising one Ukrainian position after the other, they have secured Orlivka and Tonenke. With other words: after buying time for over a month – so that a new defence line can be constructed behind them – two days ago the ZSU troops have withdrawn from these two villages and into their new defence line.

Novopavlivka… ‘just’ positional fighting for Krasnohorivka, Heorhiivka, Novomykhailivka, and Pobieda.

Robotine… there was another series of the Russian assaults, the last week, but ever since it’s quiet in this area, too.

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The content is published with the permission of the author. First published here

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