Because I’m widely acknowledged as ignorant and arrogant, plus high-nosed and clueless when ‘reporting’ about the Arab-Israeli War, and one can’t understand the Middle East without living there for four generation, you know, today an update on latest developments in Ukraine… Perhaps I can do that better… one can never know…

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Major-General Freuding, something like ‘official commentator for Ukraine’ of the German Bundeswehr, was very happy, yesterday. He announced that the increased production and supply of artillery shells to Ukraine have significantly improved the situation on the frontlines. He said, early this year, Russia enjoyed an advantage of 8.1 in this regards, now it’s 3:1.

Not sure if the ZSU troops on the frontline are happy about the Russians still enjoying a statistical advantage of 3:1 in this regards, and there being no end in sight of that… (no, not even in 2025)… and I cannot but wonder if this is valid for all sectors of the frontline… foremost: I see no reason to be happy about the complete inability of all of the Western Europe to boom its own production of artillery ammunition in 2,5 years…

BTW, Freuding also said the Ukrainian drone production is breaking all the records, and is expected to turn out 1,5 million of FPVs. Interesting to hear there’s not a beep on the PRC curbing its exports of related parts to Ukraine…

But, it’s simply nice when everything is that fine…

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AIR WAR

The PSU – Ukrainian air force and air defence force - continues going from victory to victory, leaving a trail of fire in its wake…. sigh… Sometimes around 6 October, the Russians tracked down and smashed one of its PAC-2/3 (Patriot) SAM-systems. At least its MPG-65 and MSQ-104 radar and control vehicle, respectively. Never mind if these are not only the most precious, core-pieces of the system, but also the hardest to replace. So much so, over the last 6-7 months, ‘the West’ only managed to supply two sets.

Never mind these two crucial elements of the system were smashed by Iskanders, and never mind this happened outside Pashenya Balka, in the Dnipro Oblast, about 90 kilometres behind the frontline. And because somebody was so kind to park the two close to each other…

I think I didn’t mention this already – at least not some 90 times or so – but: when one is operating along obsolete doctrine, refuses to write a new one, never examines (nor publishes, internally) past experiences, then assigns a recently-delivered PAC-2/3s to a former S-300 unit that has spent the last two years defending western Ukraine, and thus has no clue what to expect if trying to approach the frontline… indeed: if one can’t objectively investigate at least that blue-on-blue on own F-16… well, then that with ‘lessons learned’, ‘procedures’, and ‘realistic training’ might be of some importance. But, obviously, I’m clueless about such unimportant issues, and warfare in general, so I better shut up.

….although…

…well, that itch in my small toe… well, it’s keeping my mouth open, because on the basis of this ‘no story’, plus that recent ‘incident’ where the Russians have shot down their own Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik attack UCAV, one can deduct a few thingies.

Namely, the Russians shot down that UCAV by an air-to-air missile fired by one of their interceptor that has pursued a ‘runaway UCAV’ about 20 kilometres inside/over the ZSU-controlled territory, at high altitude, and thus in clear sight – not only of multiple observers on the ground, but also all the possible of PSU’s radars.

Why is that so interesting? Why does it matter?

Firstly…no, not because everybody is explaining that the S-70 was shot down by Sukhoi Su-57, the Russia’s ‘stealth fighter of the 6^th generation’. AFAIK, despite all the related rumours, the type is _still_ not in operational service with the VKS. The reason are problems with software supposed to integrate the work of its different sensors. Those with a bit of clue about different other of Russian high-tech weapons- and communication systems in development over the last 20 years know: software problems in the Russian defence sector are nothing new. Indeed, with less than a handful of exceptions, software-related problems have sealed the fate of only some 30-40 different major Russian projects in that period of time. Point is: rather unsurprisingly, Su-57 is still ‘undergoing testing’. Read: Russian test-pilots are tasked with trying to guess what might the performances of the aircraft become, once it receives all of its ‘planned’ equipment. And, well, _test pilots_ do not like to guess. Unsurprisingly, there are major problems with writing the flight- and tactical manuals for the Su-57. And without these, nobody in Russia is ever going to send the jet into combat…

…no, also not because – as nicely explained by Tatarigami, two weeks ago (but, why should anybody pay attention, eh?) – the production of the Su-57 is heading nowhere because the Russians cannot import crucial electronics of Western origin (that much about ‘sanctions are not working’, too).

…no, not because the S-70 was claimed to be a ‘loyal wingman’ to the Su-57, i.e. a UCAV steered by pilot of that ‘stealth’ jet and whatever other fantasies: this part of the ‘integration’ of the two has never worked for exactly the same reason the Russians can’t manufacture Su-57s (nor S-70s) in series…

But, because this with the downing of that S-70 has ‘revealed’ (or confirmed) that the VKS actually needs no stealth aircraft in Ukraine at all. The reason is that it’s already for months (and perfectly) capable of operating its ‘conventional’ (‘non-stealth’) types over the frontline. Unsurprisingly, the S-70 was shot down by either an Su-30 or Su-35, and the PSU couldn’t down the latter although it ‘dared’ flying 20+ kilometres over the ZSU-controlled territory, while – as reported in regards of the fall of Vuhledar – there are sectors of the frontline where the VKS meanwhile ‘dares’ flying even Tu-22M-3 bombers into direct strikes on ZSU positions.

(….which, BTW, is ‘perfectly fine’ with the Russians also because gauging by photographs of S-70’s wreckage, the aerodynamics of that UCAV might be ‘stealth shaped’, but its surface finish is none of that, gaps between its control surfaces are none of that, rivets and other seams are even less so, and that’s not to talk about the materials from which its skin and internal structure were made…)

Who needs ‘stealth’ when the enemy has no serious air defences?

Regardless if the VKS is deploying ‘stealth’ aircraft (and UCAVs) or not, these two affairs (the downing of the S-70 and then the smashing of that Patriot SAM-system) are a confirmation of something I’ve tried to explain already back in summer this year: that the PSU’s air defences have been attrited to the level where they are not only unable of covering large sectors of the frontline (whether due to the lack of missiles, or because it’s too dangerous for their major air defence systems), but to the level where the Russians do not even need ‘stealth’ aircraft/UCAVs, nor even their UMPK glide-bombs to bomb the Ukrainian ground troops. Because their older jets – like Su-30s and Su-35s – can operate ‘almost freely’ over the frontlines, at least at higher altitudes (outside the range of Ukrainian-operated MANPADS, for example).

Conclusion is on hand that after 2,5 years of this war, the VKS is back to doing what it was designed and created for, and that is: establishing at least aerial dominance, if not air superiority over the battlefield.

Arguably, their slower-, low-flying types – like Su-24s and Su-25s – are not yet entirely free, as obvious from the fact a Su-25 was shot down about 10 days ago. Seemingly, at least a handful of ZSU brigades still have some MANPADS or other types of SHORADs (short-range air defence systems) on hand. But, when the Russians can bomb ZSU positions with full range of stuff like FAB-250M-54 and FAB-250M-62, FAB-500M-54 and FAB-500M-52m, FAB-1500M-54, FAB-3000M-54, FAB-5000M-54, OFAB-250s and OFAB-500s, RBK-250 and RBK-500, or ODAB-500 and ODAB-1500 etc… then, sorry: that simply doesn’t matter. In such case, even Ukrainian UAV-strikes on the Russian storage sites of UMPK-kits are pointless.

…and nobody needs to wonder how comes the ZSU continues losing troops and ground. Even if, yes, at a ‘very slow pace’…

In other news related to air warfare…

Germany reported to have transferred two additional IRIS-T SAM-systems to Ukraine (one SLM and one SLS, both financed in cooperation with Norway), while France reported that the upgrade of its Mirage 2000s for the PSU is progressing, and is going to include adaptation of AASM bombs. Their delivery is expected for the first quarter of 2025.

On Sunday, 6 October, the Russians streamed 87 Shaheds into the Ukrainian airspace, the Ukrainians claimed 56 as shot down and 28 as jammed.

On Monday, 7 October, the Russians streamed some 75 Shaheds into the Ukrainian airspace (actually: exact number remains unclear), the Ukrainians claimed 32 as shot down and 37 as jammed.

On Tuesday, 8 October, the Russians streamed 19 Shaheds into the Ukrainian airspace, the Ukrainians claimed 18 shot down.

On Wednesday, 9 October, the Russians streamed 22 Shaheds into the Ukrainian airspace, the Ukrainians claimed 21 as shot down.

Additionally, the Russians fired 7 Iskanders, 2 Kh-59s, and (on Monday) 3 Kinzhals during the same period: one Iskander, one Kh-59 and two Kinzhals were claimed as shot down by the PSU. Both Kinzhals while approaching the Kyiv area; the third hit the Starokostyantyniv AB. Sadly, defences of Odesa were less successful: on Sunday and on Monday, one Iskander each hit the southern docks of the local port, hitting merchants Paresa (registered in St. Kitts & Nevis), and Optima (registered in Palau, one person killed).

Iskander-M strike on one of two merchants known to have been hit while loading in southern part of the port of Odesa, on 6 and 7 October.

Kherson remains the most-heavily hit city I Ukraine of this ‘season’: at least 19 were wounded, mostly by Russian FPVs intentionally targeting civililans.

In turn, on 6 October, an Ukrainian UAV strike hit the Moscow Higher Combined Arms Command School in Kuzminki, starting a large fire. On Monday, 7 October, a combination of one ATACMS and several Ukrainian UAVs has hit the oil depot of Feodosia, setting it afire. That is: no, Ukrainians didn’t hit it but the Russians shot down all the incoming UAVs, and then the debris fell to the ground and caused a fire… and then a conflagration… and every night another two or three tanks blow ups and so for three days already, at least according to the Russians… BTW, on the same night, also Saky and Belbek ABs were targeted by Ukrainian UAVs.

Yesterday, 12 Ukrainian attack UAVs have hit the 67^th Arsenal of the VSRF in the Bryansk area. Ukrainians claim this was the primary ammo depot of the VSRF Group Sever (Kursk), storing North Korean-made ammunition calibre 122- and 152mm, and aviation bombs (much of that in the open).

The last night, Ukrainian attack UAVs have targeted numerous military facilities in the Russian Federation: in Kuban, Kursk, Volgograd, and in Rostov. The ammunition depot of the Khanska/Khanskaya AB in the Krasnodar Oblast (home-base of the 272^nd Training Aviation Base) is known to have been hit, causing a fire. The same is valid for Leysk AB. Another UAV is said to have hit a ‘Shahed depot’ in the Oktyabarskyi area of the Krasnodar Oblast. There were numerous – and powerful – ‘secondaries’: reportedly, ‘400 of attack UAVs’ were destroyed with a single blow. Latest ‘updates’ are quoting ‘153 Shaheds and 4,5 million tons aviation fuel...

One of secondaries caused by the Ukrainian UAV-strike on 'a ‘Shahed depot’ in the Okyabarskyi.

Honestly: if few other thingies in this war would be better, and I wouldn’t be as tired as I am, I would be happy about all these news. Because, finally, after all the times – and then without any of super-turbo-Western weaponry – Ukraine is, seriously, striking back. Indeed, I would be delighted to say that Trio Fantasticus in the white House can stuff all of their ATACMS’ and Scholz can stuff his Taurus’… where the Sun never shines: Ukraine doesn’t need them. Even more so because gauging by developments of the last few days, or nights, Ukraine meanwhile has so many of suitable UCAVs, it’s striking deep into Russia almost every night, and it’s hitting major ammunition and supply depots, and air bases.

Problem is that results largely remain obscure, and my experience from studying different other air wars is that ‘fire and smoke’ are anything else but ‘equal to a clear confirmation of success’. Especially not of success with clear effects upon the enemy’s capability to continue waging a war of this kind. Thus, currently, I’m just ‘cautiously optimistic’. At least the number of strikes of this kind, and the number of UAVs used are growing, and that’s a good sign.

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Now for the ground warfare…

Kursk…Up front, the VSRF Group Sever is meanwhile ‘back’ to around 70,000 troops in grand total, of which around 40,000 are deployed around the Ukrainian-controlled bulge. The FSB-commanded conglomerate of disparate brigades, regiments, and battalion is armed with about 100 tanks, 500 other armoured fighting vehicles, 200 artillery pieces, and up to 100 multiple rocket launchers. And they’re back to trying to squeeze the ZSU out of the Kursk Oblast: the last few days it transpired the Russians have assaulted and managed to enter Darino and Nikolayevo-Darino. Arguably, the ZSU forced them out again, but did not manage to establish firm control over either. Therefore, a battalion was brought in that attempted a counterattack from Tolstyi Lug in direction of Obukhovka: seems, this was stopped short of that village, though. With other words: once again, the Ukrainians didn’t manage to really stop the Russians, and this time they didn’t manage to at least flank and hit them in serious fashion. Which in turn means: yet more of Russian attacks are to follow.

At least the Russian logistics works along the Russian logic: for example, the 810^th Naval Infantry has collected to buy an electronic warfare system, but on arrival in the combat zone this was collected by the Akhmat Chechens, and that’s it.

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Northern Kharkiv…the Russians have reinforced their forces in this area too, and since the last week – and with significant dose of close air support by Su-25s and attack helicopters of the VKS – have managed to recover parts of central Vovchansk – apparently including the Aggregate Plant.

A Su-25 of the VKS, as seen from an Ukrainian UAV, back in late September.

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BATTLE OF DONASS

Kupyansk-Svatove… The Russians are back to assaulting directly towards Kupyansk, from the north, from the Synkivka area. Might have reached Petropavlivka in the process: Ukrainians are reporting to have repelled the first attack on that village.

Siversk… the Russian claim about ‘collapse of Ukrainian frontlines’ in this area, and the ‘capture of Verkhnokamyanske’ is a lots of baloney. Actually, they’ve used UAVs to drop their flag on a building in this village, then fabricated a resulting video etc… the frontline remains where it was. Their ‘presence’ in Hryhorivka was limited to two (in digits: 2) troops.

Bakhmut… the Russian assault groups are meanwhile regularly crossing the Siversky Donets – Donbas Canal, even if they seem still unable to establish a firm bridgehead on the western side, inside Chasiv Yar.

Toretsk… the Russians have taken the ZSU by surprise and, from central Toretsk, attacked towards south-west and south, seizing a stretch of territory east of the two slag heaps. Indeed, they have widened their penetration into central Toretsk by an all-out attack into its southern suburbs. As said in my last update: considering the current composition of the ZSU garrison in this town, I’m not surprised there are many Ukrainians expecting the town to fall by December…

Pokrovsk… this is something like the only sector where the Russian advance ‘visibly’ slowed down this week. At least by some. The reason appears to be ‘obvious’: colossal losses of the VSRF. And, indeed, by the ‘Western’ metrics, the Russian losses in the Pokrovsk sector cannot but be described as a disaster. And then a veritable disaster, too, because it’s confirmed by hundreds of videos every day.

However, as much as the Russians are losing more armoured fighting vehicles and artillery than they can recover from storage left behind by the USSR  and around 1,000 killed and badly wounded on average per day (and that not only in the Pokrovsk sector, but everywhere), so also Ukrainians cannot replace their losses in combat vehicles and artillery. Because domestic production is minimal, and ‘the West’ is simply not delivering any new tanks nor infantry fighting vehicles, for example (declaring 302 Swedish PbV 302s, deliveries of which began the last week, for ‘infantry fighting vehicles’ is a good joke…). That’s why it’s only ‘mildly pleasant’ to hear German reports according to which the mobilisation in Ukraine has been ‘significantly improved’ this year, or French reports according to which they’re training an entire brigade of the ZSU equipped with their arms.

Foremost: the expectations like that VSRF’s losses might convince the Russians that it’s pointless to continue… well, that reminds me strongly of ‘we’re going to swim in the Azov Sea, next summer’, from autumn 2022. Putin might be experiencing growing problems with mobilisation, but is solving these in simplest fashion: by offering ever more money in return. Which means that at least a significant portion of his troops remain volunteers, no mobiks and/or recruits. And, volunteers are always fighting better than anybody else (or at least enduring far more)...

Moreover, the ZSU is still too slow in reacting to unexpected, and so the Russians continued widening  their penetrations in direction of Lysivka and Vyshneve, north and south of Selydove, respectivelly. What’s the point of skilfully holding the place, when neighbouring units just can’t hold their positions… well, we’re going to see, that’s sure.

Kurahove… here too, many Ukrainians are giving the place/area ‘about a month longer’. Whether the losses they expect the VSRF to suffer in the process are really going to ‘convince the Russians to stop’… hkhm… not so sure. And: that’s still in the future. Right now the situation is such that – despite repeated mauling and massive losses on the hands of the 46^th Airborne, ZSU – the Russians have entered the village of Ostrovske, directly east of Kurakhove. Air strikes by UMPKs and Iskanders have demolished the dam on the Vovcha River and thus very little water is left in the reservoir ‘protecting’ the northern side of the town.

Vuhledar… I remain amazed at complete ignorance of this zone by all the top Ukrainian war-monitors and commentators. Seems, these are in agreement with the GenStab-U. Like, ‘ah, it doesn’t matter’. Well, perhaps not yet? And, not if you don’t know any of the troops serving there?

Certainly enough, this week the Russians continued their grinding towards north, in direction of Bohoyavlenka. They have also entered (and, apparently: seized?) Zolota Nyva. North of this area, they’re also advancing on Antonvika and Yelyzavetivka. At this pace, they’re going to reach Velyka Novosilka, Shakhtarske and Uspenivka already before Decembe, not ‘just by the end of the year’…

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Have said this in reaction to a reader’s comment, few days ago: this is beginning to remind me of start of the final phase of what I call the Syrian Agony (2011-2017): see, early 2016. Everything was ‘fine’ and ‘promising’ and ‘it was clear’ and ‘obvious’ what are the Assadists, Hezbollah and the IRGC doing, and they were suffering heavy losses too, and – contrary to Ukraine now – there were also enough troops and ammo to counter that… and yet, Syria fell.

First because it was abandoned by the USA, then because the zombie idiots in the EU followed in fashion. Can only hope Ukraine is not going to follow down the same path: sure, right now there are lots of ‘promising developments’, but they’re going to become effective only through the spring of 2025. And until then… well, certain things in the ZSU are still not changing at all, and lots of water is going to flow down the Dnipro…

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The text is published with the permission of the author. First published here.