Photo: General Staff of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

‍Before I continue with my analysis of the F-16s for and in Ukraine (and all the related issues), here a short analysis of the current stand, plus few updates from battlefields.

Generally, yes, as is widely known, meanwhile, the Russians are experiencing growing problems with the re-supply of armoured fighting vehicles (indeed: even with their maintenance and repairs), and with morale. However, they are continuing their mobilisation efforts at the same pace like most of the last-, and all of this year, and thus experiencing no problems in regards of available manpower.

Furthermore, VSRF has also adapted its tactics once again: nowadays, they’re primarily (though not exclusively) assaulting sectors of the frontline held by ZSU units ‘renowned’ as ‘shaky’ or ‘not as effective’, as better units. For example: 41^st Mechanised Brigade (Toretsk-Horlivka).

I think I should stress this fact. It is a logical consequence of that with ‘procedures’ within the ZSU (and PSU), I’ve described the last week: essentially, the failure of the GenStab-U to write a new set of service regulations, based on combat experiences from the last 10 years. As result, the mass of ZSU commanders are still both trained and acting along Soviet-style principles (indeed: nowadays, they’re ‘better’ in this discipline than the Russians); relatively few are trained and acting on basis of recent experiences. This is resulting in the creation of a ‘two-tiers’ armed force, with different units having very disparate combat effectiveness.

….which is also a response to questions in style of ‘and how comes the ZSU is still holding out and having an exchange rate of at least 4:1’… – i.e. killing or injuring at least four Russians for every own killed or injured?

Sigh… You really want to know what kind of example is coming to my mind when I hear about such ‘exchange ratios’?

Back in 1998-2001, during the II Congo War, the troops of the Zimbabwean Defence Force (ZDF) deployed in the DR Congo (DRC) were facing similar-, or even worse odds the ZSU is facing nowadays. The entire ZDF included a total of six brigades: on average, only two of these were deployed in the DRC at the same time. They were facing a miscellany of up to a dozen of Rwandan-, or Rwandan-controlled brigades, and that while having to hold a ‘frontline’ of nearly 2,000 kilometres, in one of densest jungles of this planet. However, ZDF-troops were all well-trained professionals. Sure, the Rwandan officers, and the mass of their non-commissioned officers (see: sergeants) were US-, British-, South African-, even Zimbabwe-trained: but, the mass of their troops was not. On the contrary, the Rwandan officers tended to ‘waste’ their troops in almost exactly the same fashion like the Russian officers are (mis)treating their troops nowadays.

(…and, if you think this was some ‘bimbo-war’, fought by ‘arrows and spears’… please, kindly discontinue reading this…)

Rather unsurprisingly: the ZDF achieved an average exchange ratio of 27:1 in that war (and mind: this is based on post-operational inspections of the battlefield).

Sure, the ZDF lost more than 50% of the DRC in the process. And, until today, it’s entirely ignored both by the Rwandans (they were always explaining about ‘fighting Angolans’, who were not even around for most of that war), and their Western supporters - or at least belittled in the West because of their silly dictator Robert Mugabe. But, the ZDF was a serious, professional, well-trained force. So much so, some of its battalions were cut off by the enemy advance and had to be kept alive for more than a year (primarily with help of supplies from the air and via local rivers). But, eventually, the ZDF fought the Rwandan onslaughts to a standstill. Because its troops were FAR better trained than those of the enemy.

In Ukraine nowadays, there are few excellently commanded brigades, and excellently trained troops. AFAIK, their average exchange ratios are somewhere around 14-15:1.

….and then there is a mass of ZSU generals and brigades that are nowhere near as good.

That’s why the total average exchange ratio between the ZSU and the VSRF is at mere 4:1. Sorry, but this is not enough.

Unless this changes, fundamentally, nothing’s going to change in the flow of this war – and that regardless how much arms and ammunition the West sends to Ukraine. And this change must start from the head: the GenStab-U must introduce sweeping reforms of itself, in turn resulting in sweeping reforms of the force.

Something similar is valid for the Russians. While succumbing to Pudding’s pressure, their GenStab has degenerated the entire force into a uniformed mob. However, the entire concept of the VSRF as a highly-mobile, heavily mechanised force with plentiful of firepower has failed in this war. Even with all the 'add-ons', their tanks and their IFVs and APCs are all lacking the armour necessary to survive the modern war.

(Of course: the same is valid for the Western AFV-concept, too: after all, the Western strategists are 'expecting' their IFVs, APCs and mine-clearing vehicles to follow MBTs into this kind of a brawl - while being much thinner-skinned than MBTs, which can barely survive this kind of defensive fire, mines, and other obstacles.)

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In regards of air warfare: a lot has happened the last few days, but related reporting is so ‘scattered’, that I need to collect more information in order to become capable of serious analysis; to at least understand the ‘where and why’ (not ‘just’ the ‘when and what’).

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NORTHERN KHARKIV

Ironically, there’s ‘little to report’ – except for battles, battles, battles, and yet more battles. Positional battles. This is so because the ZSU fought the VSRF offensive to an effective standstill, but the Russians are still attacking, and the Ukrainians counterattacking, and neither side has enough forces and firepower to win. Of course, the summer heat is having its impact upon the exhaustion of both sides.

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BATTLE OF DONBAS

Kupyansk-Svatove… the Russians have secured all of Pischane and are meanwhile assaulting north and west from that hamlet.

Siversk… incremental Russian advances (100-150m) have been reported from the Rozdolivka area. Well, in about 6 months, they might reach Bilohorivka (the one on the Siversky Donets) from this direction: no reason for anybody in the West to care, or send yet more heavy equipment to Ukraine, of course…

Bakhmut… it’s the same like in northern Kharkiv: Russian assaults, and yet more assaults, but all minor in total scope and gaining nothing. Actually, the last week, what was left of the 98^th VDV Division was foremost busy accepting yet more mobiks and securing the ruins of the Kanal District.

Toretsk-Horlivka… over the last week, the Russians remained busy widening their penetration from Novoselivka on Niu York. Ironically: foremost in eastern direction. Sure, the ZSU meanwhile withdrew from its positions in the resulting ‘cauldron’ (some 500m wide, with two lines along the old ‘LOC’, i.e. the line of control from 2014-2022 period), but in turn the Russians haven’t had the troops and ammo to continue pushing into the centre of Niu York or into Nelipivka. Probably for the same reasons, the Russians could not continue their assaults into Druzhba, Pivnichne, and/Uor Zalizne, further north.

Avdiivka-Pokrovsk… The Russians continued grinding from Lozuvatske and Prohres in western direction. Back on 23 July, they have encircled one of ZSU fortifications in between of these two villages, and the Ukrainians had to evacuate the same. There is a similar ZSU field fortification south of Prohres (about 200m west of Yevhenivka), and the Russians are assaulting it for something like a week now. AFAIK, meanwhile, they’re on its eastern edges. Behind the frontlines, the Russians continued savaging Ukrainian rear areas with their UMPK glide-bombs, the Ukrainians continued doing the same with their FPVs.

Mariinka… on the northern side of this sector, few days ago the Russians launched one of their largest mechanised assaults of recent times: have sent 11 tanks and 45 other armoured fighting vehicles, 12 motorcycles and 200 troops attack positions of the 79^th Airborne Assault Brigade. Of course, the attack was proceeded by severe air strikes, even more severe- and hours-long artillery barrages, and covered by a dense smoke screen. It didn’t work: the 79^th reported the destruction of 6 tanks, 7 APCs, all 12 motorcycles, and to have kuddled 40, and injured 37 Russians.

Vuhledar… starting with 19 July, the Russians launched a number of assaults on the stretch of the frontline north of Mykilske, and have gained some 100-200 metres along a frontline of nearly 2,000 metres.

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Southern frontlines-, and the frontline along the Dnipro were ‘quiet’ the last week, with exception of the airspace, of course. Both sides continue striking each other with UAVs, and the Russians continued pounding the Kherson area with artillery and air strikes. As mentioned above: more about this in the coming days.

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