1) Tom, you communicate what the official Kiev says and take it for granted.

Yes, I report the statement of the official Kiev about the number of launched and shot down Russian missiles. But these are just statements, and I try to use the word “statements” in relation to them all the time. I hope I don't need to explain the difference between “statement” and “fact”.

Also, this does not mean that I take these numbers for granted or expect it from you.

Just for example: my research experience has taught me that one “thing” is that, regardless of the country and government in question, about 0 of the official reports withstand thorough cross-examination. It often takes 30-40 years to know the “truth,” but in fact, official reports of modern warfare are as “reliable” as any rumors spread on social media.

Okay, then why am I still doing it, why send you official reports?

Because what I do on this blog is I chronicle the messages to create starting points for future research. The study of military affairs is very similar to mathematics: you need a reference point. If you want, “zero value”: something to begin with, on the basis of which the study begins, to which 1, 2, 3 or any other numbers are then added, and then the formulas, calculations begin to be applied. That is, then the person begins to collect information and check everything - to make sure, to get the facts. Sometime in the future, much better, more authoritative information will become available. But at the moment there is no “starting point” other than official statements: even if I know perfectly well that they are not “reliable”, they help to assess at least the overall scale of the attack; whether it was, for example, a “major attack/attempt” or a “minor attack/attempt”.

Obviously this does not mean that I perceive the officially released figures as “definitive” or want you to do so. Those who are even a little familiar with my work know well: I never do this. In addition, I mention this data and then give figures made public by other sources or based on my own research. But this research takes time: sometimes 30-40 years. Sorry, but right now I can't teleport myself 30-40 years into the future.

2) Where are the Russians heading in Ukraine now?

In advance, note that the Ukrainian authorities are very good at blocking all information about what exactly the Russians are trying to target, and not just about what they manage to target. Thus, there is very little reliable information from Ukraine. Indeed, I have only seen those 6-7 videos and photos that show the effects of Russian strikes, such as December 29 and January 2, that are on all social networks.

Russian contacts and sources also know very little.

The result is obvious: uncertainty. However, some conclusions can already be drawn.

A. Unlike last season (2022-2023), when the main targets of Russian missile strikes on Ukraine were the power grid and the power supply system, this year — or at least since December 23, 2023 — they appear to be aimed primarily at the Ukrainian defense industry.

B. Secondary targets are the main command facilities (or “nodes”) of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and air bases of the Ukrainian Air Forces (PSU).

A few examples:

Kyiv: On January 2, the Russians claimed to have deployed Dagger air ballistic missiles (launched by their MiG-31K fighter-bombers) to strike the “main underground command post”, which was reportedly located at the time of the shelling General Zaluzhny, commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces.

Kharkiv: On December 29 and January 2, the Russians claimed to have destroyed a “UAV production shop” (or “factory” or “assembly shop”) in the Kharkiv region.

Odessa: On December 29 and January 2, the Russians claimed to have struck “port facilities and fuel depots” in the Odessa region.

Kyiv: On January 2, the Russians claimed to have hit or disabled two NASAMS ground-to-air systems in the vicinity of Kiev.

PSU airbases: On December 31, the Russians claimed to have hit the “air bases” of the PSU.

IN. For comparison, in the past one or two weeks, I know of only one “impact” — or any damage — to the Ukrainian power system: the January 2 strike should have left about 260,000 Kyiv residents without light (I don't know how long, but, as always, relevant inputs are welcome). The reported reason: the airline was cut, but it is not clear what: it could be a Russian missile, it could be a Ukrainian one or even debris. It's just not clear whether it was intentional or accidental (I'll explain the reasons below).

By the way, one of the Russian missiles malfunctioned and crashedon the territory of Russia, causing significant material damage.

3) Is there a problem that the Russians are really “targeting civilians” in Ukraine with their missile strikes (as is widely claimed)?

Sorry to disappoint, but I don't think so.

Undoubtedly - indeed, there is no doubt - Russian ballistic and cruise missiles have already claimed the lives of hundreds of Ukrainians. Whole families were destroyed. When a missile such as, for example, the X-22, crashes into a residential building, be sure: it is not to survive. No explosion from detonation, no fire, much less fragments flying around, or the collapse of the building in question.

“Problem”: When someone uses such heavy and inaccurate missiles to target military sites in cities, civilians get hit. One way or another. They suffer either from the missile, its impact, or the effects of its warhead, or from the debris of a downed rocket, or from missiles fired in an attempt to shoot down approaching missiles. This has already happened dozens of times both in this war and in many previous wars.

Western military authorities have developed an ironic definition of “collateral damage” for such cases. In the Western public (say, during the conflict in Libya, where the West enjoyed such a luxurious advantage that it could choose its targets as it was convenient for individual pilots), attacks that cause “serious collateral damage” are considered “unacceptable.” However, this does not mean that they have never occurred, but rather too much in the last 10-20 years.

Moreover, one has only to see the West's response to the bombing of Iraq or Syria in the last 10 years, or the Israeli bombing of the Gaza Strip in the last three months — and many of the conclusions are more than obvious. Most importantly, “collateral damage” is not only regularly inflicted, but is actually “tolerated” (sometimes even “claimed”) by the public in the West. And also that the Western authorities also widely lie about the amounts of “collateral damage”. If in doubt, check the website here: airwars.org

And since such “target-picking practices” have not been properly pursued by Western authorities for decades (indeed: they are routinely whitewashed), so put your hand on your heart: ask yourself, why then should the Russians worry that they are causing “collateral damage” to Ukraine?

In other words: this is exactly the same problem with disregard for valid international laws and rules of warfare. When the West systematically ignores this, even supporting violations of laws and regulations for decades, then it sets precedents for the likes of the “Putin system” in Russia to ignore them as well.

4) Several questions were about Russian X-22 missiles and statements that Ukrainians could not shoot them down, but also related to point 3, i.e. “collateral damage”.

I thought I covered this in a separate article. At least I remember writing something on the subject and drawing the following illustration based on one of the Soviet instructions for the X-22, but now I can't find it.

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