Once again, and because that ‘campaign’ is not letting up, I’ll start with a few words for a growing army of all those – especially in the USA – still (or: ‘now even more’) demanding, insisting etc. on ‘negotiations’ (with Russia) to end this war.

Please, girls and boys, have no doubts: there are negotiations with Moscow run by different mediators all the time. All the while, at least since 28 February 2022. What you do not know is that, so far, Pudding is showing no interest in ending this was in any way that would enable a sovereign Ukraine to continue existing. He’s holding on all the conquered territories and insisting on their annexation – without any kind of concessions. Indeed: official Moscow is denying both Ukraine’s sovereignty and identity, and is showing no interest at all in securing a coexistence. Only an interest in ending Ukraine.

Thus, and regardless what kind of nonsense are different newspapers claiming or recommending, that was that way back in February and March 2022, that was that way in June and July-, and then in September-October of the same year; and that is that way ever since. Nothing has changed in this regards.

Therefore – and this is especially for those in the rearmost rows – Ukraine remains subjected to a war of extermination, and Russia remains insistent on an extermination of Ukraine. Should there be any doubts about this, check what happens on territories conquered and annexed by Russia. Ukrainians must give up their identity, freedom, language and culture, the right to self-determination – and even then are subjected to repression and all sorts of human rights violations, including mass-murder, torture, gang-rape, looting etc.

Of course, you’re all free to correct me but, so far, I have neither heard nor read any kind of ideas how to force Russia into making any kind of necessary concessions in regards of Ukraine – by other means than through war. All the pleas for Pudding to stop this were fruitless.

So, whoever is sure this war can be ended through negotiations: please, be so kind and lead by example. Go there to Moscow and negotiate. I’m sincerely supporting any such initiatives (just not expecting anything at all from them). Alternatively, the characters in question are free to grant to Russia any part of their countries and their populations. Perhaps even their own homes? Who knows: perhaps that’s going to make Pudding happy….

For the ‘others’ reading this: well, ‘negotiations’ and ‘arms deliveries’ aren’t excluding each other. Rather completing each other. My point is: without arms deliveries Ukraine can’t force Russia to negotiate at anything else than its own conditions.

This means that the only way to end this war remains the same like it was already in February-March 2022: deliver Ukraine what it takes to change the military situation and thus force Russia to make concessions (best of all would be to force it to withdraw, completely, from Ukraine).

….with which I think I’ve said everything about the state of affairs in Russia: essentially, and just like for centuries already, nothing else matters there but who is in charge. Ironically, a part of me is sad about this because… well, I remain in touch with a number of Russians, and know at least few there are ‘still sane’: not succumbing to the daily brainwashing by Pudding’s PRBS-machinery directly comparable to that from Orwell’s 1984… But, they’re far too few and hopelessly out of condition to do anything at all.

While this is a matter of fact about which one can change very little, there is something else that’s making me more worries: that’s Ukraine, its government, media, and parts of the population. No doubt, the government is excelling in the PR-game. However, at the same time it can’t explain even to its own population how comes the ZSU is making lots of costly mistakes. And it was ‘highly successful’ in turning enough Poles and Slovaks against Ukraine to prompt changes in behaviour of local governments (even to influence local elections, at least in the case of Slovakia). And at least as successful in messing around in Washington DC without securing anything like guaranteed, serious, and continuous US support. Essentially, right now nothing is sure regarding the US support for Ukraine beyond elections in November this year.

Similarly, emboldened by strong and effective resistance of the ZSU in the first year after Pudding’s all-out invasion, Ukrainian media was (and remains) arrogant, if not outright dumb enough to drive the entire country into something like ‘we’re already victorious just because the West is delivering some stuff’-mode, back in spring 2023. Despite all the possible warnings to remain cautious. And since the summer counteroffensive resulted only in minimal advances, but also in heavy Ukrainian losses (albeit at hefty price for the Russians), meanwhile the Ukrainian media switched to something like ‘the West abandoned us, we can’t win’-mode.

Apparently, in Ukraine, that branch is meanwhile perfectly Westernised, and thus having only two modes: 0 or 1…

At least as concerning is a growing number of private Ukrainians, who are meanwhile behaving like little kids that are denied their favourite toy: wisenheimers, excelling in all sorts of personal attacks in the social media. Characteristically, the same are still happy to spread ‘news’ about deaths of this or that Russian general, or about terrible conditions in the Russian positions, about epidemics and about malnutrition of troops, about entire districts of Moscow being left without heating, about population being requested to help collect firewood for different of air force’s bases… And, no doubt, videos like this one – showing the work of a Russian medic on the frontlines – do ‘document’ much worse conditions than within Ukrainian trenches:

However, after 2+8 years of this fracas, one would hope that people happy to report about dead Russian generals, or enjoying such videos might finally accept the reality: all of this simply doesn’t matter. The Russians still have enough generals to staff two entire divisions just with them; moreover, they still have many more troops and these are fighting. What’s worse: for weeks already, the rate of their (claimed) daily losses is significantly lower than the rate of their (assessed) newly trained reservists. Means: they’re all the time sending yet more troops to the frontline.

To Ukrainian luck, the country also has neighbours its government (and the media, and private persons) did not manage to put off (at least not yet). For example: Bucharest (Rumania) is accelerating the construction of a highway to the border with Ukraine. This is running something like from the capitol to Buzau, Forcsani, Bacau, Pascani, to Siret – i.e. parallel to the western border of Moldova. Tragic is that this is not really going to help that much, because one simply can’t haul as much stuff by truck as one could per train. Not to talk about ships. Still, and strangely enough, there are no reports anything of similar kind happening along the coast: for example, about expansion of the railway line over the Danube and down to the Bulgaria and Turkey – which would help increase Ukrainian grain exports from the Odesa area. Apparently, somebody there has concluded this for unnecessary?

The Russians are diligently constructing, too. Foremost that new railway line from Rostov via Taganrog to Staromarivka and Volnovakha to Mariupol and then to Melitopol. Ukrainians are lately targeting the construction site in the Staromarivka area with M142s and M270s. Additionally, on 6 January, Ukrainian special forces blew up the incomplete railway bridge on the new Russian railway line at Hranitne.

AIR WAR

The ‘biggest’ news of the last few days was the appearance of North Korean-made ballistic missiles… What’s known about them? According to what came out of official Kyiv and Washington by now, these are said to be designated the Hwasong-11G or KN-23, which is solid-fuel-powered, weighting around 3,500kg (7,500lbs) on launch, and closely resembling the Russian-made Iskander missiles (principal differences are the slightly wider diameter of the North Korean missile, then the different nozzles, internal electrical windings and few other details). One was deployed on 30 December 2023 (‘hit an empty field’), and ‘several’ on 2 January 2024 (these seem to have hit something because Americans say ‘results are still being assessed’). All were fired against Kharkiv (where at least two people were killed) and the Zaporizhzhya areas: two of major Ukrainian cities still not protected by US-made PAC-2/3 SAM-sites. KN-23s have a range of around 900km but no: regardless what some say, Kn-23s are not ‘akin to US-made MGM-140 ATACMs’. The Kn-23 has a CEP of around 100 metres – if provided by satellite guidance. If relying on older, instrumental navigation system (INS) only, then around 200 metres. Means: its far less precise than the US weapon.

During the afternoon of 4 January, Ukraine hit back by striking the Saky Air Base, in western Crimea, SAM-sites in Dzhankoi and Yevpatoriya, the port of Sevastopol, and the Kerch Bridge, and then a major Russian headquarters in Novofedorovka. Reportedly, up to 23 high-ranking Russian officers were killed. This strike was followed by at least one wave of UAVs that targeted not only the occupied Crimea, but also the Belgorod region.

During the night from 6 to 7 January, the Russians released Shaheds LPGMs over Ukraine only: the PSU claimed 21 as shot down.

Early on 8 January, the Russians run their third round of this winter’s missile campaign. A total of 59 missiles and LPGMs were detected and the following claimed:

-          Shaheed LPGMs: 8 out of 8 claimed shot down

-          Kinzhal: 0 out of 4 claimed shot down

-          Kh-101/555: 18 out of 24 claimed shot down

The Russians also released:

-          8 Kh-22

-          6 Iskander-Ms, and

-          2 Kh-31Ps.

Targets were military facilities and military-production facilities again.

The last night, Ukrainians have deployed UAVs to hit the Engels AB, and one of oil-storage sites in the Oriol region (Orelnefteprodukt).  

Ah yes, and: France is in the process of delivering 85 additional SCALP-EG missiles to Ukraine.

BATTLE OF DONBASS

Yes, fighting is reported along the entire frontline – and that for weeks already.

Why?

Because the Russians are falling for their own mythology about ‘Russian superiority in winter warfare’ – happily accepted and spread in the West, too. And then not only by different of Western Experten, but by hordes of Pudding-fans as well. Correspondingly, they’re attacking in the Synkivka area on Lyman Pershi and towards Kupyansk, from Kislovka area towards Kupyansk, and from Kuzemovka in direction of Borova. Further south, they’re attacking from Kremina in direction of Lyman, from Soledar in direction of Siversk, and from Bakhmut in direction of Slovyansk and Konstantynovka.

Why am I reporting nothing about this? Because, and as tragic as this is for the troops involved, and regardless of fierce fighting for Lyman Pershi, Yahidne and Novoselivske (or, better said: what’s left of these villages), in grand total there is actually nothing to report: for months already, and despite continuous fighting, neither side is making any kind of progress. The Russians have troops and lots of armoured vehicles, but also problems with command and communication; Ukrainians have problems with command and less troops, but enough firepower to smash any Russian attack. Or at least to recover any ground they might have lost. Overall, no matter how much is what side claiming about attacking and capturing, in grand total, there’s next to no advance.  

It is a little bit different in the Bakhmut area. In the last few weeks, the Russians have pushed north-west of the ruined town and pushed Ukrainians back to Bohdanivka. Turther south, they’re attacking into the forest north of Klishchivka, with some local success only, so far.

In the Avdiivka area, Ukrainians have launched several local counterattacks, the last few days. For example, two days ago, they pushed the Russians away from Stepove to the railway berm, and in the south they have recovered a strip of terrain east of the town.

Official Kyiv is still trying to deny or ignore this fact, but the Russians have meanwhile secured all of Mariinka and pushed further west and south. Sure, the town was completely demolished and the Russians have bleed the DPR-’Army’ to death in the process, but: Mariinka is now under their control.

In turn, early this month Ukrainians counterattacked further south, from Novomyhailivka in south-eastern direction and pushed the Russians back. Means not much in grand total, but: in this way both the old railway line to Mariupol (interrupted since the start of the war) and the new one remain well within range of Ukrainian artillery and multiple rocket launch systems like M142 HIMARS and M270 MLRS.

Yes, and for example, back in late December, the Russians launched several attacks between Noroprokopivka and Verbove (Robotyne area, southern Zaporizhzhya). Yes, some of these have managed to breach forward Ukrainian lines; Ukrainian troops were killed and captured (or captured and then killed, as so often). But, meanwhile, the 82^nd Airborne has counterattacked and – with support of M142 and M270 multiple rocket launchers that destroyed about a dozen of Russian guns – not only recovered most of the lost terrain, but wedged itself into the Russian trench system connecting Hills 161, 162 and 166.

Dnipro. Ukrainian Marines claim to have repelled no less than eight additional Russian counterattacks in the Oleshyk and Krymky areas – over the last 36 hours alone. An entire battalion of the VDV commanded by Col Ospanov should’ve been smashed in the process: indeed, along reports in the Russian social media, the Russians in that area have lost up to 90% of their combat vehicles, meanwhile. But, they’re still counterattacking.

Bottom line: yup, currently, this is just another episode in the war of attrition.

The content is published with the permission of the author. First published here.