It’s 1 September: time for me to clean up the pile of reports and photos that came together during August, and create a new folder for September…

….it’s also the traditional first day of the new school year in Ukraine. The war is going on, of course: from what one can read in Ukrainian media, and with exception of schools closer to the frontlines, all the tuition is going to be run ‘normally’, in schools – provided these have suitable air raid shelters. Where that’s not the case, kids will have to receive their lessons online.

AIR/MISSILE WARFARE

The last few days, it was foremost the Russians that were celebrating – with big fireworks, all over western Russia. Because September is coming and there’s the annual migration of famed Ukrainian migration UAVs. Correspondingly, the huge Kresty AB, outside Pskov, was hit, early on 30 August: two Ilyushin Il-76 transports were definitely destroyed, two others at least damaged, and word is that another three might have suffered some kind of damage, too. Make no mistake: the Keystone Cops in Moscow have denied anything else beyond little damage…

Foremost, this attack was not the only one: actually, it can be said that the Ukrainian SBU is running a sort of a ‘strategic bombing campaign’ against selected targets in western Russia. Still, RUMINT has it that this attack – over 700km away from the nearest point on Ukrainian border - caused such a shock that the Chief Keystone Cop in Moscow, Shoygu, reported to Pudding that they’ve been attacked by NATO from bases in Estonia. He, simply, couldn’t believe this was Ukrainians – and, truth to be said: this was really an attack very far from Ukraine, and except that UAVs were used, nobody can properly explain it. Correspondingly, he demanded a retaliation strike. On NATO. This was bad news, but Pudding didn’t trust Shoygu. Arguably, and as kind as Pudding is, he neither shot nor fired him, either. Went to ask Gerasimov instead, and Gerasimov told him that Russia wouldn’t survive a war with NATO. Quite a party crasher, that guy….and so, so the story, cooler heads prevailed: Gerasimov called Milli on the ‘Hotline’, Milli explained him it wasn’t USA/NATO, and everything cooled down…

BTW, Kresty AB and Pskov are the very centre of the Russian VDV (airborne troops), and of multiple Russian PMCs (‘private military companies’), and thus of the Russian strategic military reserve. And, just like in the case of Tu-22M-3 bombers knocked out by Ukrainian UAVs earlier: Il-76s are out of production already decades (I know, I know: the Keystone Cops are claiming something else….), and there is a chronic shortage of them since years, and thus every single loss is – literally – irreplaceable, which is another reason why this strike hurt so much.

….and this attack came ‘on top’ of renewed UAV-strikes on Moscow (recorded hits or shoot-downs came from the north and the centre of the city, from Kaluga, Tula, and Ryazan, and from Bryansk and Oryol, further south).

Ah yes, and: the PSU also pounded selected targets in Luhansk, in Donetsk, and on the occupied Crimea peninsula (for example):

-          Russian HQ in Novodruzhesk, NW of Lysychansk was hit),

-          another base/depot in Donetsk, too;

-          Fedosia was hit (on 30 August),

-          Bryansk was hit by Ukrainian UAVs (two times: once on 30 and once on 31 August; known are hits on the local airport, used by the VKS for forward-deploying its attack helicopters, but also on the Kremniy EL plant: one of most important factories for micro-electronics, like that used in Russian ballistic- and cruise missiles),

-          a Russian base between Ivanivka and Oleksiivka on the southern side of the Dnipro Delta in southern Kherson was HIMARSed (early on 30 August),

-          Dzhankoy on the occupied Crimea was hit (early on 30 August), and

-          Pskov came under attack the last night again….or at least the nervous air defences opened fire at the sky….

….which, as much as potentially dangerous, is just as good, because this means that the Keystone Cops are now going to have to withdraw yet additional air defence systems from elsewhere in Russia, and from Ukraine, to bolster air defence of such ‘neuralgic’ objects – in turn weakening the defence of some others. Because, Pudding – and/or his PRBS-industry – explained this is all a special military operation, and it will be over in a matter of days, and there’s no threat for Russia. And thus, he cannot ignore the threat. While, Russia is simply huge, and neither the VKS nor the VSRF have enough air defence systems to properly protect every single place within Ukrainian reach (meanwhile estimated at 800-1000km away from Ukraine). Moreover, the mass of Russian air defence systems is designed to counter aircraft, helicopters, and cruise missiles: not the small and barely detectable UAVs. And, as we’ve seen repeatedly the last few months, they’re not even good in countering threats they were designed to fight – like Ukrainian Su-24s armed with Storm Shadow and SCALP-EGs, or Su-27s armed with JDAMs… which is why even VKS’s Tu-22s are meanwhile receiving ‘cope cage’ protection, and Tu-95s some sort of ‘camouflage’ on their top sides, as visible on sat photos here.

On the negative side, the intensive activity of the SBU-operated UAVs of the last weeks has forced the VKS to intensify its combat air patrols along the frontlines, too. And so, one of its Su-35S interceptors is said to have engaged a pair of PSU’s (Ukrainian Air Force) Mil Mi-8 helicopters with R-37M long-range air-to-air missiles, yesterday. This is anything else than official, but word is that both crashed while trying to make an emergency landing, killing all six crewmembers (their death was officially confirmed, meanwhile; the circumstances are ‘under investigation’, as usually).  

Don’t worry, the Keystone Cops have tried to hit back in other fashion, too. Early on 30 August, they’ve released 28 Kh-101/555 cruise missiles and 15 Shahed-136 LPGMs: according to official Kyiv, all were shot down…

BATTLE OF DONBAS

Kupyansk-Svatove-Kremina….since the Russians withdrew their VDV from this sector, their latest  attacks north of Kupyansk came forward so well, that meanwhile it’s the ZSU that’s making – small, but still – advances in the area of Lyman Pershyi. Minor advances of the ZSU were reported from the Serebryansk Forest, too.

Bakhmut….north…the last week it was foremost the ZSU that was making advances from the north in direction of Soledar.

Klishchivka….considering even the Russians have meanwhile admitted that they have lost Klishchivka, I, most sincerely, hope that both the bothsidists and video-or-it-didn’t-happen fraction are going to, finally, stop reporting that half the place is still under the Russian control – and accept that all of the village is under Ukrainian control (and that already since early August). And Andriivka, too. I.e. that we can, finally, close this chapter. Even more so because meanwhile Ukrainians are back to making their usual, methodical, slow advances in directions of Opytne, Odradivka, and Mikolaivka.

UKRAINIAN COUNTEROFFENSIVE

Must admit, at first I didn’t even pay attention at some of the following news. But, then it dawned upon me, ‘too’ (yes, I can be very slow in comprehending few thingies): to make things ‘better’ and ‘easier’ for the Russians, and in the light of the Keystone Cops sending so many VDV troops from western Luhansk to southern Zaporizhzhya, the last few days the ZSU ‘re-opened’ and ‘widened’ its offensive operations in the latter area, and in south-western Donetsk. Correspondingly, launched one attack south of Vuhledar, reportedly recovering one village there.

In similar fashion, in the Novoprokopivka-Tokmak area, the ZSU widened the active sector of the frontline by re-deploying the 82^nd Airborne to Verbove. Apparently, this came rather unexpectedly for the 417^th Reconnaissance Regiment, which fell back and had to be bolstered by VDV in a big rush. As a result, Ukrainians are meanwhile fighting well inside the southern part of that village. And, to make things yet more interesting for the 48^th CAA, they’re seem to have mauled the 108^th VDV as this was deploying into the Surovikin Line, west of Verbove, and then captured that section of the (2^nd) Russian defence line. With this, this sector of the Russian Maginot was breached at a width of some 3,200m. The last I’ve heard in this regards is that the HQ 58^th CAA threw all that’s left of the 71^st MRR, plus BARS-1/3/11/14 back into the battle in attempt of preventing an Ukrainian advance in direction of Romanivske and/or Ocheretuvate.

To no small degree, this success was made possible by additional Ukrainian attacks further north-east: over the last week, the ZSU attacked the Russians in the Novopokrovka area, squeezing them from three sides, plus quite a successful attack in the Polohy area. I do not have precise details about these operations, though: can only conclude that this has forced the Russians to deploy their ‘strategic reserve’ – VDV troops mentioned above – much more thinly, than ‘simply’ concentrating all of them in the Novoprokopivka area.

Dnipro… again, I’ve got no contacts in this area, so can’t really say what’s going on. Word is, though, that the ZSU did manage to secure the Datchi area, on the eastern side of the Antonovsky Bridge, as of 29 August. Besides, this is unimportant: at least the GRU thinks so. Thus, its operatives are busy hunting and arresting Russian troops serving in that area and reporting about their experiences in the social media. Me thinks, that’s logical. And it’s simple: it’s far easier to go on arresting ‘dissidents’, than finding and fighting those Ukrainian sons of a gun…

 This text is published with the author's consent. First published here