Misconception 1: Erdoğan will lose due to the devastating impact of the earthquake because 15% of his voters live in the affected regions.

In fact: Erdoğan's lowest ratings were in mid-2022 due to the catastrophic depreciation of the lira and rising prices. Instead, the earthquake showed that all the houses built by the state-owned company TOKI survived. Since the beginning of 2023, Erdoğan's ratings have been increasing, and now the gap between the opposition candidate Kilicdaroğlu and the current president is less than 3%.

Misconception 2: The opposition will win because it united for the first time and nominated a single candidate against Erdoğan.

In fact: The first national presidential election was held in Türkiye in 2014. Then the opposition united 14 parties that supported the former Secretary General of the Islamic Conference Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoğlu as the only candidate against Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan. Because of this, 2 million voters of both the right and the left did not come to the polling stations. Currently, the only candidate, Kemal Kilichdaroğlu, is supported by 6 parties from the "Nation" coalition. Another 6 parties from the Left Bloc refused to nominate their own candidate, so as not to disperse the votes of Erdoğan's opponents. Instead, 4 parties that were against Erdoğan in 2014 currently support the current president - the Nationalist Action Party, the Democratic Left Party, the Great Unity Party, and the Independent Türkiye Party.

Misconception 3: President Erdoğan will pursue nationalist policies and the opposition will be more pro-Western. The West is betting on the opposition.

In fact: President Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party are the least nationalist party both in the right sector and compared to the left forces. AKP is almost the most globalist and economically liberal party in the country. Although in the last 10 years, it has abandoned many liberal views in politics, such as the rights of women and sexual minorities but in relation to migrants and refugees, Erdogan still remains the most liberal politician. Instead, the opposition is going to close the borders, make it more difficult for foreigners to get a residence permit, and even ban them from buying real estate. As for the pro-Western nature of the opposition, the largest party in the bloc - Republican People's Party - has a very high number of supporters of good relations with Russia, Iran, and China.

Misconception 4: In order to improve his position, Erdoğan brought Mehmet Şimşek, a popular economist in his government, out of political obscurity, and this may attract investors to the side of the government.

In fact: ex-finance minister Mehmet Şimşek publicly refused to return to politics after two invitations from Erdoğan. The 2017 constitutional amendment and the re-election of Erdoğan as president with unlimited powers reduced the role of other officials in the Turkish system of governance. Currently, in Türkiye, everything is decided by one politician, and ministers, governors, and even deputies are extras. The fate of the heads of the Central Bank of the republic, who was recently changed every six months, is indicative. The return of any of the famous economists or lawyers now is unlikely to restore investor confidence in Türkiye.

Misconception 5: The representatives of the opposition have nothing to brag about because they have not been in power for 20 years.

In fact: First, in Türkiye, local self-government bodies are still powerful because of the country's long-standing desire to join the EU. In recent years, Erdoğan has undermined the powers of municipalities, but the opposition (both secular and Kurdish) controlled dozens of large cities in the West and East of the country. Second, the opposition squandered its chance to come to power in the summer of 2015, when Erdoğan's party failed to gain a majority in parliament. The failure to agree has created a situation where the electorate has decided that only AKP mono majorities led by Erdoğan are effective, and his opponents can return to Türkiye the coalition strife and instability of the 1990s.