Unpacking Russian Info Ops in Türkiye: Distrust, Disinformation and Disorientation (Part I. Putting Putin in Domestic Context)

If one listens to the Turkish media long enough, it is easy to believe that Russia is under attack, Ukraine has never existed as a sovereign state with independent domestic and foreign policy, and the West has insidiously used the “puppet government” in Kyiv to weaken Putin’s regime. In line with this logic, Russia has not invaded Ukraine but was dragged into the conflict by the provocative moves of NATO (which Türkiye itself has been a member of since 1952) and its desire to establish military bases in the Black Sea region (with Türkiye hosting a few and Ukraine still having none). Thus, many would argue, a reasonable compromise is needed from both sides to reconciliate “two neighbours at war”. Comments like “one cannot expect Russia to capitulate”, “nuclear powers never surrender”, and “it is the West who is capitalizing on a protracted conflict with Moscow” can be equally heard from taxi drivers and respected experts.

Despite Turkish government’s unceasing political, diplomatic and practical support to restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine, 10 months into the war Turkish media are still dominated by (pro)Russian narratives and remain as vulnerable to the Kremlin’s info ops as ever.

The reasons for that are complex and often go far beyond Ukraine’s borders. 

One part of the problem is a deep-rooted distrust to the West, which creates a fertile ground for any conspiracy theories, fake news and disinformation campaigns putting the blame on the US and other “external powers” for destabilization and militarization of the region. Türkiye may be a polarized country, but one thing seems to unite people from across the political spectrum and all segments of society: Islamists and secularists, liberals and conservatives, nationalists and Eurasianists similarly share a strong anti-Western resentment, which makes them easy targets for Russian operations of influence. 

Partially, the anti-Western discourse in Turkish media (to which Ukraine has become a part) is reinforced by an increasingly nationalistic rhetoric of the government, which is likely to grow even more so ahead of the presidential and parliamentary elections planned for the next year. President’s spokesperson and chief foreign policy advisor likes to quote Voltaire’s words on the Holy Roman Empire, which he said “was neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire”. Bringing parallels with the current situation, he explains that the “new world order” after the World War II was “neither new, nor ‘world’ (global), nor was it an order,” but simply a transition from a bipolar to a US-led unipolar system. So, commenting on the Russian war in Ukraine, Ibrahim Kalin usually starts by condemning the occupation of the Ukrainian territories but later explains a broader dimension of the conflict: until recently “there has been a world order under the US hegemony; now Russia calls to build an order based on egalitarian justice”. 

Turkish President Erdogan himself often refers to the Russian invasion of Ukraine as Vladimir Putin’s attempts to question the “unfair” world system and redesign global governance in a fundamental way, engaging with other non-Western powers like Türkiye. “Russia is not an ordinary state; it is a powerful state. The West, especially the US, is attacking Russia almost with no limits. Of course, Russia is showing great resistance when faced with this,” – the national broadcaster TRT quoted Erdogan as saying before the November G-20 summit.

This nationalistic and anti-American rhetoric is not necessarily meant to be pro-Russian. Nor does it mean that official Ankara has changed its stance on military supplies to Ukraine, closure of the Straits for Russian warships or engaging in efforts to keep the grain deal alive. However, while serving domestic-driven policies to promote Türkiye’s diplomatic successes as a peace broker and highlight the privileges of enduring cooperation with Russia in energy and trade for the Turkish voters, it is also reinforcing Moscow’s own playbook.

Experts stress that with this strong anti-Western ideological posturing and continuous support from Kremlin, Russia’s narratives have gained ground among political and military elites, experts and academia, pro-governmental and oppositional media outlets, both right- and leftwing. This helps to shape domestic public debate in line with Russian interests.

One of the leading Turkish analysts studying the rise of dis/misinformation in Turkish media back in 2019 argued that fake news was not even needed in Turkish social media: “because domestic disinformation is rampant, Moscow has managed to infect both sides of the debate”. In fact, having analyzed more than 173 million digital content he concluded that “Russia has won the information war in Türkiye” even without starting it. Because the pro-Russian opinion is so dominant in the Turkish information sphere and pro-Russian sentiments are so integrated into the mainstream media, there is no need for additional Russian or pro-Russian information operations, he argued. “This doesn’t mean Russian disinformation or information operations don’t exist in Türkiye. Rather, [this means] that distinctly pro-Russian views are disseminated by mainstream pro-government and opposition media networks,” the study concluded. 

Another survey on “Russia’s use of media and information operations in Türkiye” showed how (pro-)Russian media sought to undermine Türkiye’s political and security cooperation with the US and Europe by exacerbating mutual skepticism and highlighting policy differences. The study echoed the same view that Russian media in Türkiye have significantly contributed to the anti-American discourse. According to experts, by shaping media responses to three successive crises in Türkiye: 2015 shootdown of a Russian aircraft, 2016 failed coup attempt, and assassination of the Russian ambassador, Russian media strategies aimed at promoting the Kremlin’s foreign policy objectives: undermining the NATO unity and instigating mutual suspicion between Türkiye and its Western allies; impeding Ankara’s opposition to Russian actions in Eurasia and the Middle East; and influencing Turkish internal political developments to make Türkiye a more compliant partner. Looking back at the dynamics of the Turkish-Russian and Turkish-US relations in the recent years, it would be fair to say they have largely reached their goals. 

At least, before Russia’s major failures in Ukraine – both on the battlefield and in the information space.