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photo by Suspilne
On September 11, 2022, on the 21st anniversary of the biggest terrorist attack in human history, the danger of a new, even bigger atrocity has receded a little.
The situation around ZNPP has been resolved, at least temporarily. All power units have been put into cold storage. The probability of severe damage to equipment with the transition into a nuclear accident has decreased manifold. We don't know what prompted the bandits to put a pulled pin in the grenade, but they did it. I think they were told about Rosatom's prospects in building foreign NPPs, exporting Russian FE (fuel element), and recycling waste. Although Russia has been quite successful in attacking world institutions, there are issues that can’t be handled without the IAEA and the UN. Perhaps one day we will understand the price of compromise, but certainly not now.
By the time the IAEA mission arrived, Russia's program-maximum at ZNPP was as follows:
1) Having created an unacceptable risk, put it in the IAEA report to force Ukraine to capitulate through nuclear blackmail of the whole world;
2) Seize ZNPP from Ukraine and switch it over to Russia;
3) Take 6 GW out of our energy system, destroy the economy and the ability to export energy to the EU, which could compensate for the shutdown of the Nord Stream
To achieve the first two goals, they have chosen the NPP's system of its own needs - the devices that power the equipment for normal operation. The NPP can receive energy through four lines, one of which goes towards Crimea. "Bavovna" in Dzhankoy left the Russian Federation without this line, but by 1 September the substation was repaired and the Russian Federation damaged all the Ukrainian lines, leaving ZNPP without normal power at all. This entailed such a situation at the plant where the only chance of avoiding an accident was an urgent (within an hour) connection to the Russian Federation power system via Dzhankoy - Melitopol.
They counted on that a nuclear power plant without its own needs covered was like a nuclear grenade with its pin pulled, and connection to the Russian Federation was the only chance to put the pin in place. For propaganda in such a situation, the Russian Federation looked like a savior, and Ukraine as the one that puts the world on the brink of nuclear catastrophe. There are spectacular pictures on TV: a cloud of steam above Block 6, smoke from a dozen 5-megawatt diesels and a countdown to a hydrogen explosion and nuclear apocalypse - a nuclear power plant without power does really look like that. In the beginning, everything went according to the scenario. With the lines down, the guys managed to keep unit 6 running and power their own needs from it. In this mode, the turbine can operate for up to 4 hours ( an hour according to the instructions), then the blades start to hit and break. To prevent us from repairing the line during this time, the Russian Federation has put military personnel near the damages and on the switchboards.
They miscalculated again.
ZNPP engineers and management found a solution: they connected all the unit pumps, cooling towers, and everything that could consume power. This gave the turbine an opportunity to work without destroying itself. This regime is heavy and complicated, the pin is not yet in the grenade - but the release lever is in a steady hand. We lasted three days in this condition, after which we were able to power our own needs from the outside and stop the last hot unit. We can breathe out: no catastrophe has occurred. All the units are in cold condition and their own needs are supplied through two lines. The 10-day crisis is over.
Let's try to understand what it was.
The lines were damaged three times and three times they were restarted instead of going to a safe mode. Understandably, there were arguments for such a decision. Of course, today, in hindsight, we see that nothing would stop the Russian Federation and they would escalate the situation to the limit. Apparently, for some time it seemed like the curators of Rosatom would not allow the nuclear power plant to "go to zero", understanding the consequences for Russia itself. On one side of the scale of the decision was nuclear safety, on the other - was the economy, without which it is impossible to fight further. It was the economy that prevailed, bringing the world to the brink of nuclear catastrophe and this is not an exaggeration. I hope we have learned this lesson.
But the third goal has been achieved by the enemy: without ZNPP we will have a hard time surviving the winter. Not only they have shown us that by destroying the two thermal power plants they wouldn’t stop there, but they have opened a "second front" - the energy one, and they are destroying the energy sector, not in their "powerless rage", but according to a sneaky, well thought-out plan. On this "front" the military is powerless - it is not their territory. The situation has not ended, it has simply become different: the nuclear threat has been replaced by the utility threat. Leaving people and businesses without heat and power, Russia will again force us to capitulate. So when we say "We will not surrender", we must understand the meaning of these words: survive the hardships of winter, the blackouts of heat, light, and gas. But to win we must be prepared to pay this price, and it is much less than the price that our guys pay in the trenches.
Note the "scales" again: on one side are the people, and on the other side is the economy. The thing is that the energy sector works as usual, and the energy is traded on the exchange. It turns out that on the one hand there are people's lives and on the other the profits of speculators, including those based on force majeure. What choice is there?
We must urgently put the energy sector in martial law and organize the defense of the energy "front". If this is not done, we will only be able to eliminate accidents caused by shelling, lose the economy, and plunge people into despondency. And also we will divert forces and resources of the army to the protection and defense of energy facilities, which are almost impossible to defend by military means.
What is martial law in the economy? The word "profit" and "development" will disappear from the vocabulary of strategic enterprises; they will have to work in the interests of the country and the army. Everything that is not related to operational activities should be excluded from budgets. The task of an enterprise is to maintain the army and keep the people who will be able to restore it after the war.
I will explain why this is important. Today about half of the facilities have been withdrawn from the energy balance and every kilowatt counts. Generation owners have lost half of their income from the facilities shutdown, and the remainder is used to maintain the shutdown facilities, which is not a little money. This increases the cost of energy, and the generation is forced to "solve the problem" at the expense of consumers. Protecting the population, the government shifts the cost of public utilities onto the shoulders of the industry, for which the current 6 hryvnias per kilowatt are unaffordable and the price will keep growing. Only a total fool may believe that the market will "regulate" the situation.
Yesterday, an energy headquarters was set up in Ukraine; the details are still unknown. One would like to believe it is not just to respond to shelling, following the initiative of the enemy. The good news is that the HQ needs to do the following:
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