Credits to the artist Khalil Dervish    

Never before has the whole state played the role of a terrorist and the whole world of a hostage. 

Ukraine is conducting a special operation to free the facility as its owner. Probably other special agencies help us, but even there are neither specially trained fighters and commanders, nor experience in conducting operations with such a high price of any move. Russia also has no experience, which aggravates the risk of mistakes and accidents leading into a nuclear catastrophe.

It is impossible to predict here, so I will only tell you about the mechanics so that you are not misled by someone else's predictions. It is impossible to damage a reactor plant with a shell, missile, or bomb. But it is possible to make it explode on its own. As it is possible to kill a person by, for example, just cutting an artery.

The ZNPP operation is advised by Rosatom, that has very high-level professionals. They are the ones who determine the technical goals to achieve the political goals. Many facilities can be damaged for the sake of taking a picture, almost without harming the operation of the nuclear power plant. The specialists who are seconded to ZNPP act as intermediaries between Rosatom and the military, are monitoring information on the ground and indicating where they can shoot. They can't control the power unit, but they are able to assess the operator's actions and put him to a firing squad. Before starting attacks, they go to a shelter, this is a repeatedly proven fact. That is, the Russian Federation has a working vertical.

Ukraine has no such a vertical. The Zaporizhzhya NPP's head is the general director. He can give the command to stop the units and die together with the executives and their families: the lead engineer, the shift supervisor of the NPP, the unit shift supervisor, the reactor division shift supervisor, the lead engineer on turbine controller. To make such a decision, one needs to be 100% sure that it is the only right one. There are a lot of options - and none of them is good. If you want more details, read Georgi Balakan, Nikolai Steinberg, Olga Kosharna on FB or Linkedin.

The complexity of the task requires the consolidation of the best specialists. We need to create and maintain an "Emergency Plan" - a document that describes possible scenarios, and the response to them in cooperation with the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ministry of Interior Affairs, firefighters, and authorities. The entire USSR worked for this task at the Chernobyl NPP: authorities, science, industry, and finance, but the Japanese failed to do so with Fukushima. I'm sure the IAEA will be happy to get the best experts together and they will work selflessly on the task.

Now let's see what's at stake additionally. 

First of all, google the price of electricity abroad and multiply by 6 units. This is more than 10 billion euros a year, and the owner of this money has already been identified in Russia. It is unlikely that he is willing to lose such an amount "to get revenge", or "to save face". Threats to turn ZNPP into nuclear ashes, of course, are a bluff for the information war. Each target is carefully calculated by experts. But when the game is played at extreme risks, something can go wrong any moment.

Secondly, licensed operating stuff for nuclear power plants that Russia trains abroad. It takes 10 years and $10 million to train a specialist; there are about 150 of them at ZNPP. They get from $4000 abroad, we can lose them along with the opportunity to run the units after we win. Do you understand why the militants shot up the ZNPP simulator on the first night, where those specialists are trained?

Today there are only two units out of six operating at ZNPP. But a unit cannot stay "just like that"; as long as it has fuel in it, it releases heat, which must be removed. If it’s not done - the coolant heats up at the rate of 10...30 degrees per hour, then it boils over, and then the fuel element is destroyed, like in the Fukushima scenario. Next to the reactor, there is a storage pool with the used fuel that also gets heated. To prevent this from happening, the water and electricity for the pumps are needed, as well as the auxiliary water and pumps to circulate it. This "second" water is in 6 pools, which are mined and can be detonated one by one, raising the stakes. The explosion of three pools leads to a total loss of cooling of two or four units.

The operating units have to be stopped first, this requires normal operating equipment to work. If there is no power supply, it has to be stopped by emergency pumps - it is very difficult, and it entails failures and damages, that can turn into accidents on the plant and far beyound it. The Russian Federation will avoid such a situation to the last minute, so they won’t damage the stolen unit "for themselves". 

Fires are a special risk, they can be unpredictable. There is enough hydrogen in the operating unit to blow up the roof of the turbine hall for several meters away. The valves would go off, the roar of which (over 140 dB) would explode the mines in all six pools. And that is not the only bad scenario. 

In the times of peace, when the "Fire" command was given, first the station fire department was called, then the city, district, region, adjacent regions - hundreds of vehicles with crews and other equipment, and various support mechanisms were involved. You understand, that there is none of this now.

If all the units stop operating without any troubles, explosions, or fires, the most vulnerable part of the NPP is the power for its own needs. It can be obtained via four lines - the same lines that carry it to the consumers. Any one of them can be shot, fully or partially - depending on the task. On 22.08.22 we had three lines cut out of operation at once, they were restored, but this can happen again at any time.

To connect to their line, the Russian Federation needs a pause in the nuclear power plant’s operation, which is easy to arrange by damaging some nodes a bit. Once connected, they can cut off the other 3 lines - then we will not be able to disable the last one, which will work for Crimea and further, wherever they decide to stretch out. If we lose all 4 lines - then we have 10 days of diesel generators on their own diesel fuel and another 10 days in reserve. Then everything depends on whether we can restore at least some power and get some diesel fuel.

Imagine, there are 6 nuclear reactors running on diesel, the fuel supplies are blocked, the terrorist group demands unconditional surrender with mocking terms and every hour is really bringing Fukushima closer and everyone around the whole world knows about it. It all depends on who can't take it anymore. 

And yet we have the advantage. We have the truth on our side and the world is willing to do whatever it takes to free itself from the role of victim. 

We can and must outplay the terrorist by our collective mind.